Rusia

Que desastre es la industria naval rusa, solo barcos de corbeta pa abajo y submarinos...

Delivery Date of 1st Project 22350 Frigate Admiral Gorshkov to Russian Navy Still Uncertain

The Project 22350 (NATO reporting name: Admiral Gorshkov-class) frigate family’s lead ship, the Admiral Gorshkov, has passed the official tests, but a decision on its delivery will be taken after a revision of all of its systems, according to a source in the defense industry.

The Project 22350 lead frigate Admiral Gorshkov is planned to be delivered to Russia’s Navy in November 2016, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ Armament Department Lieutenant-General Anatoly Gulyayev said on the single military hardware acceptance day.
The first ship of the new Russian Navy frigate project 22350 class "Admiral Gorshkov" at full speed

"The frigate has passed its official trials and will be subjected to a revision of all of its mechanisms and systems. The delivery date depends on the revision," the source said. According to him, the problems revealed by the Gorshkov’s tests will be ironed out in subsequent ships in the series, which construction, hence, will take less time.

Previously, Armed Forces Main Armament Directorate Chief Anatoly Gulyayev had said that the frigate was slated for delivery to the Russian Navy in November 2016. According to him, the timing can be influenced by the problems experienced by the air defense missile systems designed for the ships in the class.

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2016/november-2016-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4549-delivery-date-of-1st-project-22350-frigate-admiral-gorshkov-to-russian-navy-still-uncertain.html

The lead ship of the Project 22350 series was laid down in early 2006 and set afloat in the fall of 2010. The frigate started its trials in November 2014. The second ship of the class, the Admiral Kasatonov, was launched in 2014, with the launch of the third one, the Admiral Golovko, scheduled for 2017.

The Project 22350 frigate displaces 4,500 tons and accelerate to 29 knots. She carries, inter alia, the Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile) and Kalibr (SS-N-27 Sizzler) missile systems and Poliment-Redut surface-to-air missile system.

Russian naval air defense in trouble
July 28, 2016

There have long been reports that the ongoing delays with the commissioning of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate have to do with defects in its air defense systems. These were thought to be primarily related to problems with integration of the Poliment Redut air defense missile system. The Poliment system was designed to be Russia’s answer to AEGIS, with four phased array antennas that are able to track 16 targets at the same time. The Redut system consists of four or eight vertical launch systems that launch three types of missiles. The 9M100 is the short-range missile, with a range of up to 15km. The 9M96M is the medium-range missile, with a range of 40-50km. Finally, the 9M96 long-range missile is supposed to have a range of up to 150km.

It now appears that the Redut’s problems are much more serious than just integration. A recent report notes that the Ministry of Defense has stopped trials of the system because of continuing problems with the 9M96 long-range missile. Specifically, the missiles appear to fail after three seconds of flight. Some reports indicate that the Redut system works well hitting targets up to 40km away, but fails in the long range. The implication is that the short and medium range missiles work well, but the long range missile does not. Nevertheless, this may be an improvement over previous results, as trials of the Redut system on the Steregushchiy class corvettes in 2014 showed that they were only able to hit targets at distances of up to 15km because the medium-range Furke-2 radar system was not functioning properly.

Instead of further trials, the problems will now be sorted out by an inter-agency commission, a sure sign that the problems are serious and are not expected to be fixed any time soon. The problems stem from issues at the design bureau, which is reportedly not up to the task of designing a missile with the requirements provided by the Defense Ministry. The Fakel machine design bureau, which is developing the missiles is supposedly in relatively poor condition, using technologies and equipment left over from the Soviet period.

Redut systems are supposed to be installed on both the Admiral Gorshkov frigates and the Steregushchiy class corvettes. The corvettes that have been commissioned so far with partial Redut systems that are not able to strike long-distance targets. It looks like the Russian military is now facing a choice regarding how long it is willing to wait to commission the already long-delayed first ship of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate class. So far, the Defense Ministry has not been willing to commission the frigate without a fully functional air defense system, though this may change as the delays grow longer.

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2016/november-2016-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4549-delivery-date-of-1st-project-22350-frigate-admiral-gorshkov-to-russian-navy-still-uncertain.html

Russian Naval Shipbuilding: Is It Possible to Fulfill the Kremlin’s Grand Expectations?
October 29, 2015

PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russian naval shipbuilding from our September policy conference. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

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Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent reinforcement of the region’s military forces have been combined with a general increase in naval activity—including aggressive activity vis-à-vis NATO countries’ maritime interests beyond the Black Sea. All this has led to increased international interest in Russian naval modernization plans. Although this modernization effort is going slowly, the Russian Navy’s ability to place effective long-range cruise missiles on relatively small ships means that Russia remains a serious regional maritime power with the capability to threaten not only its neighbors but much of Europe in the event of a conflict.

Russian Naval Construction Plans

Strategic nuclear deterrence will remain the number one mission of the Russian Navy in the coming decades. For this reason, the construction of Russian nuclear submarines has received priority financing and has been largely insulated from budget cuts.

The main new submarine projects include the following:

Borei-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which will replace the remaining Delta III and Delta IV submarines over the next 15 years. Three are commissioned, 3 are under construction, and 2 more are contracted.
Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), which are large and expensive. One is currently commissioned and a total of 8 are planned. Only 2 are likely to be completed by 2020 due to financial constraints on construction.
New, smaller, and cheaper nuclear submarines. Two versions: one designed for protecting naval strike groups against attack submarines and the other to be armed with cruise missiles. Construction on these submarines will start in 1-2 years, with a production goal of 16-18 of them in service by 2040.
Kalina-class diesel submarine with air independent propulsion (AIP). This will serve as the successor to the Lada-class submarine. Although the head of the Navy has said that an AIP design will be complete by the end of 2016, it is unclear how much progress has actually been made.

As for surface ships, the Navy is primarily building small ones at present, while finalizing designs for larger ships for the future. The main projects include:

Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates (FFG). Construction of these ships has been unusually slow even by the glacial pace of recent Russian shipbuilding. Eight are currently under construction, with the first scheduled to be commissioned this year. At the current rate of construction, the Navy can expect to have 5 ships of this class by 2025, and 9 by 2030.
Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates (FFG) (updated Soviet design). Six have been ordered to fill the gap left by the slow construction of the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates. Construction of the last three ships has been suspended due to the end of military cooperation with Ukraine, which produced the gas turbines for these ships.
Steregushchiy-class corvette (FFC). Four ships are in active service, 7 are under construction, and 9 more are under contract. Eighteen were originally planned to be built by 2020, although delays associated with Western sanctions are likely to reduce this number to 12-14.
Admiral Bykov-class corvette (FFC). Two are under construction, with 4 more under contract and a total of 12 expected to be built over the next 10-15 years. These ships are expected to have greater range and more self-sufficiency than their predecessors.
Buyan-M-class missile ships (PFG). These small ships are designed to be used primarily in the Caspian Flotilla and Black Sea Fleet. Three are in service, 2 are in sea trials, and 4 are under construction.
Lider-class 15,000-ton nuclear destroyers (DDG). Construction is scheduled to begin in 2018-2019, with a goal of 12 in the fleet by 2035. Some analysts argue that financial limitations mean only 3-4 of these ships will be built.
New large amphibious ships (LHD). These would have at least 14,000-ton displacement and be capable of conducting expeditionary missions. Construction of these ships is likely to start before 2020.

The Feasibility of Russian Shipbuilding Plans

Official statements related to naval shipbuilding give the appearance that the Russian Navy is undergoing a rapid revival. However, the reality is that many of these projects have faced lengthy delays and cost overruns. As a result, some of the most prominent naval procurement projects have been scaled back while others have been postponed for years at a time.

The main reasons for these delays and cost overruns involve a) long-term decline in naval research and development; b) an inability to modernize the shipbuilding industry, which is considered to be particularly outdated and poorly structured as compared to other sectors of the Russian defense industry (and has suffered more than other sectors due to Western sanctions); and c) pre-existing budgetary constraints that have been exacerbated in recent years by Russia’s economic downturn.

Russia’s current shipbuilding industry was primarily formed in the 1960-70s, and its ship design capabilities have changed little since the early 1980s. As a result, Russian naval research and development (R&D) has fallen several decades behind Western and Asian capabilities. Russian leaders recognized this problem in the late 2000s and sought to absorb Western knowledge through joint projects, such as the Russian version of the French Mistral amphibious assault ship. In addition, they organized joint projects with foreign designers such as Saipem, Wartsila, and STX in civilian shipbuilding. However, the freezing of military cooperation with NATO states in 2014 as a result of the Ukraine conflict has largely foreclosed the possibility of catching up by borrowing Western know-how. Russian naval R&D is therefore likely to remain significantly behind when compared to the Western state-of-the-art.

Western sanctions have also resulted in major problems with the production of ship components, particularly in navigation and communication equipment. Most of these components are not produced domestically in Russia, and the industry has long been dependent on imports from Europe for high quality components. Efforts to start domestic production are underway, but prices for domestic variants are relatively high while quality is relatively low.

Although it has improved somewhat in recent years, shipbuilding is one of the more poorly performing sectors of Russia’s defense industry. Russian analysts argue that Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation is the least effective of all state corporations in Russia’s defense sector. This results from its excessive size, bloated management structures, and misguided efforts to combine military and civilian shipbuilding under a single corporate roof.

Financial Constraints

The State Armament Program (SAP) for 2011-2020 assigned five trillion rubles—a quarter of its total expenditures—to military shipbuilding. This amount was almost double the amount allocated to the ground forces and airborne forces combined. According to Russian analysts, currently announced naval procurement plans would require the amount of spending on military shipbuilding to increase to six to seven trillion rubles for the next SAP.

That said, funding the existing SAP through 2020 was beyond the means of the Russian government even prior to the budget crisis that began in 2014. While the percentage of Russian GDP devoted to military spending increased from 1.5 percent in 2010 to 3.4 percent in 2014, this higher level of spending was sustainable for the Russian economy at the time. However, 70 percent of the program’s expenditures were scheduled for the second half of the ten-year program. Since Russia’s economic growth was already slowing, fulfilling these plans would have required Russian military spending to increase to unsustainable levels of 6-8 percent of GDP even without the cuts in Russia’s government budget required by the collapse of world oil prices.

El articulo completo pueden verlo qui es largo pero muy interesante

https://russiamil.wordpress.com/tag/admiral-gorshkov-frigate/

Curioso video de un IL-76 disparando su cañon trasero, y liberando carga y paracaidistas:

Rusia y sus tropas aerotransportadas, elite de la aviación rusa

Fuerzas especiales Rusas en Siria











El Gaz Tigr

Rusos....

EL T90 de fabricación rusa, va ganándo cada vez mas terreno, gracias a su desempéño en combáte , y  podría convertirse a la fecha en el Tanque líder de batalla, desplazando al tan reconocido y legendario Tanque Estadunidense M1 Abrams.

El lugarteniente general John Múrray, considera que la tecnología de los tanques estadounidenses ha alcanzado su límite y que son equiparables al de otras naciones.

Aun no puedo inserta Links por se nuevo, pero aqui les dejo la URL youtu.be/sj2zpodfdog

Fuente :

RT

Quizas no el T-90MS (es la mejor version) pero si el Armata cuando sepamos mas lo que trae y se compruebe si es tan fiable como la mayoria de tanques sovieticos/rusos ya que su motor aun le falta madurar

El armata falta demasiado para que lo quieran exportar.

proximo a entrar en servicio, el nuevo bmp-3 con torreta de 57 mm

Nuevo dron ruso :

LEONER CO G. @SUKOICRI

NotiNet informa...que RUSIA acaba de SUSTITUIR el DOLAR, en sus TRANSACCIONES con la Unión Europea por el EURO, tal cual HABIA hecho CHINA con su MONEDA el YUAN, con esta MEDIDA, en toda EUROPA el DOLAR está CONTRA las CUERDAS. "Cuesta abajo en mi rodada".

sOLOPARTE DE aMERICANO, aSIA CASI TODA ANTIDOLAR aFRICA Y OCESANIA MUY POCO COMERCIO

Como que van a tirar la toalla con ese monton de chatarra

Russian Navy may scrap its only aircraft carrier

Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, may be decommissioned if the Ministry of Defense and industry wouldn’t resolve the question of the replacing the PD-50 floating drydock needed to complete the repair of the ship hull, was reported by newspaper Izvestia, citing a source in the Russian Navy.

Russian Navy is considering prematurely decommission of its only aircraft carrier after then the PD-50 floating drydock that housed it sank.

In last year, a floating drydock holding the Admiral Kuznetsov sank following a power supply failure, causing one of the dock’s cranes to fall onto the carrier’s deck, leading to warship repair plant workers being injured. The incident left a 4×5-meter hole in the vessel’s flight deck.

Now the largest Russian Navy surface combatant ship is waiting for the decision of its fate near the wall of the 35th Repair Plant in Kola Bay near Murmansk.

Russia does not own a suitable replacement for PD-50 built-in 1980 in Sweden for the Soviet Navy.

Moreover, the project of the Russian aircraft carrier and before the tragedy caused a lot of controversies.

According to Popular Mechanics,over the last several decades, the Kuznetsov had already been beset by fires, budget cuts, and busted steam boilers. It’s so unreliable that a tugboat has been following it around on long voyages like a shadow.

Even before the PD-50 accident, a number of observers questioned the utility and expense of refurbishing the Kuznetsov. “In general, we need to critically review the domestic concept of the employment of carrier strike groups since Russia has undertaken to use the Admiral Kuznetsov to accomplish such missions,” Oleg Vladykin suggested in Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

Editor of the Moscow Defense Brief journal Mikhail Barabanov was dismissive of Kuznetsov’s upgrades. “Since Kuznetsov is not so much a combat platform as a training platform, deep modernization for her is an obvious excess.”

The Admiral Kuznetsov (heavy aircraft cruiser in Russian classification) was commissioned in 1990 and inherited by Russia upon the breakup of the USSR. The initial name of the ship was Riga; it was launched as Leonid Brezhnev, embarked on sea trials as Tbilisi, and finally named Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov after Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov.

In the immediate post–Cold War years, it rarely went to sea—conducting only six patrols between 1991 and 2015. In 2009, an electrical accident killed a crewman off the coast of Turkey. But Russia has repeatedly pushed the ship into service, and a 2016 mission off the coast of Syria saw the ship lose two jets in just three weeks.

At the moment, Russia does not have the technical and financial possibilities to restore its old aircraft carrier and also to build a series of new ones.

https://defence-blog.com/news/russian-navy-may-scrap-its-only-aircraft-carrier.html

Tanto que me discutian los genios de la subtaguara sobre el diseño del Kutz y sus deribados chinos, ese diseño es obsoleto los futuros PA chinos se asemejaran mas a concepto de la USNavy que si sabe de portaaviones.

Mientras tanto el Gerald Ford entrara pronto en servicio

al flanker le llego el fadec ...

A Puttin en Rusia le queda mucha tela por cortar, la alianza con los alemanes para proveerles de gas por un gaseoducto báltico saltando Ucrania demuestra que por primera vez despues de toda una história de guerras entre teutónicos y eslavos aceptaron que los recursos eslavos y el poder teutónico en europa depende de su colaboración.



Si este gaseoducto se concluye, lo más seguro, se acaba de eliminar a ucrania, la otan pierde relevancia en europa ( y la influencia americana ) y fortalecera a Puttin que seguira apoyando la narcodictadura venezolana, obvio estos peroles que uds hablan seran dados por rusia para rpoteger la dictadura y su influencia en la región, hay dictadura para rato.

La noticia no es nueva pero hay que tocar el tema, crónicas de una muerte anunciada, sin posibilidad de reemplazo.

El único portaaviones de Rusia se incendia; hay 1 muerto y 2 desaparecidos



Moscú (CNN) — Al menos una persona murió después de que el único portaaviones de Rusia, el Almirante Kuznetsov, se incendió el jueves por la mañana durante trabajos de reparación en el puerto ruso de Murmansk, en el Ártico, según las agencias de noticias estatales rusas.

Otras 10 personas resultaron heridas y dos están desaparecidas, informó la agencia estatal de noticias rusa TASS.

El incendio estalló mientras soldadores participan en trabajos de mantenimiento en la primera unidad de potencia. Una gruesa columna de humo negro se vio salir de la cubierta superior.

El área afectada por el humo y el fuego cubría 120 metros cuadrados, dijo TASS.

El Almirante Kuznetsov es el buque de guerra más grande de la armada rusa y su único portaaviones.

El buque de guerra realizó su primer despliegue de combate en 2016, en el Mar Mediterráneo, cuando sus aviones de combate lanzaron ataques en Siria.

Pero el portaaviones ha presentado problemas desde su regreso a Rusia para mantenimiento.

En octubre pasado, una grúa cayó sobre el barco durante los trabajos de reparación, abriendo un agujero en la cubierta.



El accidente tuvo lugar después de una interrupción del suministro eléctrico que hizo que las bombas en el muelle flotante, que sostenía el portaaviones, se averiaran y la estructura se hundiera.

La instalación, conocida como PD-50, era uno de los muelles secos flotantes más grandes del mundo y el más grande de Rusia, con 330 metros de largo y un peso de más de 80.000 toneladas.



Después de la interrupción, el PD-50 se sumergió rápidamente, haciendo que dos grúas cayeran sobre la cubierta del barco ruso, dejando un agujero de 4 por 5 metros, dijo el medio estatal Sputnik.



Después de ese accidente, las autoridades rusas dijeron a los medios estatales que el daño no retrasaría las reparaciones en el Almirante Kuznetsov, que debían completarse para 2021.

El accidente del Kuznetsov es al menos el segundo incendio mortal de la armada rusa este año.

En julio, un incendio a bordo de un sumergible ruso de aguas profundas mató a 14 tripulantes. Los submarinistas murieron por inhalación de humo después de que se incendió la nave, que estaba realizando investigaciones en aguas territoriales rusas, según TASS.

Rusia luego dijo que los detalles de ese accidente eran un “secreto de estado” y no dio más información.

https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2019/12/13/el-unico-portaaviones-de-rusia-se-incendia-hay-1-muerto-y-2-desaparecidos/