Noticias y Generalidades

Es Neil deGrasse Tyson una eminencia en Astronomía, lo que sucedió es que un sin oficio le intereso un gesto que hizo en un entrevista...lo demás ya saben

habia visto el negrito antes porque en la serie "el universo" de the history channel le hacen varias entrevista...

y bueno por las cadenas de twitter y RIM pasan la historia por curiosidad de la gente...

Alguien sabe por que los k-8 no pasaron? según leí a ultimo minuto abortaron el pasaje. Mal tiempo?

MIG-V escribió:Es Neil deGrasse Tyson una eminencia en Astronomía, lo que sucedió es que un sin oficio le intereso un gesto que hizo en un entrevista...lo demás ya saben

Moraleja:Negro que se respete no puede hacer gestos finos NI PORQUE SE PONGA FLUX,porque lo joden

MIG-V escribió:El detalle esta en la reflexión del sonido, en una ciudad
con estructuras que permita el rebote de la ondas de presión del aire
es posible que suceda, el capitulo de mythbusters toca ese punto en las
conclusiones, el experimento fue realizado en un espacio abierto donde
se disipa gran parte de las ondas

MIG-V escribió:Alguien sabe por que los k-8 no pasaron? según leí a ultimo minuto abortaron el pasaje. Mal tiempo?

Mal tiempo y muchos, pero
muchos zamuros.

Sobre figuras; las hay de todo. Depende de tus debilidades y sarcasmo

TIUNA + TCM-20

MIG-V escribió:

TIUNA + TCM-20

Muy bueno!,seguramente se colocaron en reserva los vehículos IMI,pues el veto israelí no garantizaba la cadena logística de los mismos,en caso de conflicto,es factible que duesen movilizados algunos y otros mantenidos como fuentes de repuestos.o eso,o se los desechará como chatarra.

los TCM-20 son montajes M45 quadmount que originalmente portaban 4 ametralladoras pesadas M2 que fueron sustituidas por 2 cañones Hispano-suiza HS.404 de 20mm

realmente casi nada es vetable por los israelies...

nop, la colocacion en vehiculos moviles debe ser por la llegada del ZU-23-ZOM1 (mucho mejor cañon, con direccion de tiro, terminal de informacion de combate y mira nocturna y capacidad de misiles) a diferencia del TCM-20 que no posee nada de eso (aunque originalmente tenian asociados los radares de deteccion Israelies que se me olvidó el nombre y los directores de tiro Thales Mirador) pero de forma grupal y no individial como en los ZU-23 modernizados

Faust escribió:los TCM-20 son montajes M45 quadmount que originalmente portaban 4 ametralladoras pesadas M2 que fueron sustituidas por 2 cañones Hispano-suiza HS.404 de 20mm

realmente casi nada es vetable por los israelies...

nop, la colocacion en vehiculos moviles debe ser por la llegada del ZU-23-ZOM1 (mucho mejor cañon, con direccion de tiro, terminal de informacion de combate y mira nocturna y capacidad de misiles) a diferencia del TCM-20 que no posee nada de eso (aunque originalmente tenian asociados los radares de deteccion Israelies que se me olvidó el nombre y los directores de tiro Thales Mirador) pero de forma grupal y no individial como en los ZU-23 modernizados

Lo cierto es que en ese montaje sobre tiuna,esos dos cañones proporcionan una buena capacidad de fuego de apoyo y antimaterial a la fuerza que acompañen.

Hey...no sabia donde colocar este video, aqui les va.

lo subo por que me causa impresion la forma como disparan el misil y la velocidad del mismo!!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fftd32vhKyQ&feature=related

si sabes que es un video animado? , digo, falso...

la parte del lanzamiento del misil si es animado, pero igual es identico al lanzamiento real de un misil desde un caza de 5g!! es brutal la forma con que se lanzan los proyectiles T_T!!

nooo hijo... usted staba chiquito...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v669GQ3LxTk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-14GO09j5c

100% real..

Tan wenos los videos aunque ya los habia visto!! (Y)!!

¿Cuántas y cuáles armas ha comprado el Estado? Totalizan que el gasto llega a $15 mil millones

Autor: Últimas Noticias el Mié, 05/10/2011 - 16:21.



Se estima que ha comprado en los últimos años, el Estado venezolano ha gastado 15000 millones de dólares en armas, para renovar el arsenal de las Fuerzas Armadas. Acá, una recopilación de datos difundidos por autoridades civiles y militares venezolanas, gobiernos y fabricantes de los países proveedores, organismos internacionales, así como, de publicaciones especializadas en temas de defensa sobre cuántas y cuáles armas se han comprado en la gestión del actual gobierno. La lista es recopilada por el diario regional Notitarde y reúne a países como China, España, Irán y Rusia, esta última como el país con el que se han hecho más transacciones.

Estados Unidos no figura en la lista ya que el presidente Hugo Chávez canceló las órdenes de compra pendientes de equipos militares con Estados Unidos y prohibió realizar nuevas adquisiciones de armamento en ese país desde 1999.

Bielorrusia

Un Centro de Mando y Control para la Defensa Aérea y un Centro de Mando y Control de Inteligencia, lentes individuales de visión nocturna NV/G-14 para la tropa, apuntadores laser TSL-02 y miras Red-dot PK-A para fusiles.

China

Aviones de entrenamiento de combate K-8W (1 y de transporte táctico Y-8 (; radares móviles de largo alcance JYL-1 (7) y JY-1 (3), material de intendencia y de campaña (uniformes, botas, cascos, carpas, cocinas).

Cuba

Cuatro buques de carga multipropósito del tipo holandés Damen Stan Lander 5612 y obuses norteamericanos reconstruidos M101 de 105 mm.

España

Cuatro buques patrulleros tipo Avante 2400 (Vigilancia Oceánica) y cuatro tipo Avante 1400 (Vigilancia Litoral). La empresa estatal española Navantia se encargó de la construcción de los barcos, pero los motores, sistemas electrónicos y armamento, fueron suministrados por empresas alemanas, holandesas, italianas y suizas.

Irán

Doce vehículos aéreos no tripulados (UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) y una fábrica de pólvora que estaría siendo montada en las instalaciones de la C. A. Venezolana de Industrias Militares (Cavim), en Morón, estado Carabobo.

Rusia

Armamento liviano: 100 mil fusiles de asalto Kalashnikov AK-103/AK-104, cerca de 5 mil fusiles de precisión (francotiradores) Dragunov, más de un millar de lanzacohetes portátiles antitanque RPG-7V2 de 85 mm. Asimismo, se adquirieron una planta para la producción de fusiles AK-103/AK-104 y otra para la munición de 7,62×39 mm, las cuales están siendo construidas en las instalaciones de Cavim en Maracay, estado Aragua.

Aeronaves: 24 aviones de combate Sukhoi Su-30MK2, incluidos sus sistemas de armas; 53 helicópteros (38 Mi-17V-5 multipropósito, 2 Mi-172/VIP presidencial, 3 Mi-26T2 de carga pesada y 10 Mi-35M2 de ataque). Además, un centro de entrenamiento para tripulaciones de helicópteros y dos centros de mantenimiento, uno para los Su-30MK2 y otro para helicópteros.

Artillería: obuses autopropulsados Msta-S de 152 mm (40), sistemas móviles de lanzacohetes múltiples BM-21 Grad de 152 mm (24) y Smerch de 300 mm (12); morteros remolcados Sany y autopropulsados Nona-SVK, de 120mm, y, un sistema misilístico de defensa de costa.

Defensa antiaérea: lanzamisiles portátiles Igla-S, cañones bitubos remolcados ZU-23-2 de 23 mm, y, sistemas móviles misilísticos S-300, Buk-M2E y Pechora 2M.

Blindados: tanques -reconstruidos- T-72B1 (92), vehículos de combate de infantería BMP-3 (123) y 8×8 BTR-80A (114).

Vehículos tácticos: camiones Ural modelos 6×6 4320 y 4×4 43206.

En conclusión, se desea que las inversiones en equipos militares sirvan para que la Fuerza Armada, garantice la soberanía y defensa del territorio nacional ante a las reales amenazas externas, como la que actualmente se presenta en la fachada atlántica, con las pretensiones de Guyana de extender sus fronteras marítimas en perjuicio de Venezuela.

Fuente: http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/no...tica/-cuantas-...

DJ

Por cierto mis amigos que se ha sabido con respecto a los Y-12 que vienen, aquí unas fotos del Y-12F, no saben cuál es la versión que ha de venir.

CUANDO DECIDIRÁ CHÁVEZ COMPRAR UNOS 48 BISHOS DE ESTOS:

Nuevo misil ruso hará incrementar las capacidades de combate de los cazas interceptores MiG-31

http://sp.rian.ru/images/15047/97/150479765.jpg
Click this bar to view the full image.

Moscú, 13 de febrero, RIA Novosti.
Rusia incorporará a su Fuerza Aérea un nuevo misil aire-aire que hará incrementar las capacidades de combate de los cazas interceptores MiG-31, declaró el Comandante de la Fuerza Aérea rusa, coronel general Alexandr Zelin.
Dijo que el nuevo misil ya pasa las últimas pruebas y que integrará el paquete de modernización de los cazas MiG-31.

El portavoz de la Fuerza Aérea rusa, coronel Vladímir Drik, informó en diciembre pasado que sería sometido a la modernización un total de 60 cazas interceptores MiG-31 renovados (MiG-31BM), tendrán un nuevo sistema de control de armamento y nuevos radares capaces de detectar blancos a distancias de hasta 320 kilómetros. El avión podrá seguir hasta diez blancos a la vez.

Zelin comentó, además, que la Fuerza Aérea rusa recibirá otros misiles incluido uno de crucero de largo alcance.

"Vamos a recibir un misil de crucero de largo alcance, así como misiles aire-aire, aire-radar y aire-buque, todos de gran alcance", apuntó el general.

Recordó que todos los trabajos de modernización se enmarcan en el Programa Federal de Armamento aprobado para el período de hasta 2020.

This image has been resized.
http://sp.rian.ru/images/15063/87/150638700.jpg

Chaco escribió:Por cierto mis amigos que se ha sabido con respecto a los Y-12 que vienen, aquí unas fotos del Y-12F, no saben cuál es la versión que ha de venir.

Creo que si vienen los aviones es para una Compañia privada para viajes por el Caribe.
Deberian de estar cercana su llegada


Los gobiernos de Venezuela y China firmaron 23/04/2010
el acuerdo de creación de una línea aérea que operará en el
centro-occidente venezolano y que ofrecerá tarifas "menores a las del
mercado" local, informaron hoy medios gubernamentales. El convenio fue
suscrito este viernes por las estatales china International Holding
Corporation (AVIC), y las venezolanas Sireca y Fundagrial, reseñó la
Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias. El grupo estatal chino otorgó una
financiación de "300 millones de dólares para la creación de la nueva
línea aérea venezolana-china", que llevará por nombre Línea Aérea
Bolivariana Socialista, precisó el presidente de Fundagrial, Manuel
García.

La empresa de transporte cubrirá todas las rutas de los ejes
venezolanos centro-norte-llanero y orinoco-apure, a precios menores que
en el mercado, dijo García, según la agencia estatal de información."La finalidad es interconectar a nuestros productores (agropecuarios)
con el resto de los estados (venezolanos) y con la capital del país.
Estimamos que la línea empiece a funcionar este mismo año", acotó el
directivo.

Onyx escribió:CUANDO DECIDIRÁ CHÁVEZ COMPRAR UNOS 48 BISHOS DE ESTOS:
Nuevo misil ruso hará incrementar las capacidades de combate de los cazas interceptores MiG-31

estan contratados... vendran antes de los 72 Su-35 de manera interina...

Gracias Faustino, ERES GRANDE!!!







MAYUZCULAS COMO ALGUIEN DICE

PENSAR EN NACION pensar.en.nacion@gmail.com
14-FEB-2012

F16 Fighting Falcon vs Eurofighter Typhoon vs Jets Dassault Rafale

http://www.fxinteractive.com/p155/images/f16big.jpg
F-16

Algunos de los mejores aviones en acciones de combate en el mundo. El Eurofighter Typhoon, la lucha contra Falcon F16 y el Dassault Rafale. Todos ellos presentados en París, Salón Aeronáutico de Le Bourget 2011.

VIDEO
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUJ92428ZQ8&feature=player_embedded&noredirect=1

Se agregan adicionales relacionados con Airbus A-380 Jumbo A380 A400 A400M A-400M A-400 que fueron vistos en Le Bourget Francia marcados por accidentes como de Berlín ILA 2010 Farnborough Boeing 787 Dreamliner 747-8, recuerdos de la exposición aeronáutica internacional de la aviación Airshow 2010 2011 aviones para mostrar alas de los destacados Raptor F35 F22 F18 F16 F14 Hornet TOP GUN Tomcat TOP 10 los mejores ángulos de Azul Patrouille de Suisse Patrouille de France Red Arrows Frecce Tricolori, accidente rammstein fuerza aérea Royal Jordanian equipo Hampton EE.UU. Fuerza Aérea de la Marina RAF Luftwaffe Heer Armée de l'aire de combate Aviones militares F4 Phantom P51 Mustang aviones jets rotores motores WW1 WW2 Irak sigilo bombardero B-52 tarnkappe aviones F22 de aeronaves de aviación Su27 MIG29 F15 Falcon F/A-18 Hornet Águila Dassault Rafale Chengdu J-10 JAS 39 Gripen de Saab Eurofighter Typhoon de EADS Alemania Italia Inglaterra Francia España crash rápido avión de aterrizaje jet espacio sonoro coche auge de las aeronaves diez del mundo la velocidad del sonido top 10 supersónico más rápido de transporte avión militar nasa 43 15 SR 71 MiG 25R Foxbat XB 70 Valkyrie Águila mig 31 Foxhound 111 Aardvark F-15 disparó SR-71 Blackbird cohetes más rápido mph vuelo supersónico X-15 Chuck Yeager jäger chuky mach aire estampido sónico atmósfera de la fuerza aérea de aviones militares volando bombas rusas de helicópteros con misiles de la aviación de guerra para derribar aviones de combate.

FUENTE
http://www.defencetalk.com/f16-fighting-falcon-vs-eurofighter-typhoon-dassault-rafale-fighter-jets-38852/

EL VENEZOLANO IBRAHIM LÓPEZ INVENTO UN GIROSCOPO QUE TIENE LA MISMA IMAGEN DE LO QUE CONOCEMOS COMO PLATILLO VOLADOR, DESPEGA IN SITU, ALCANZA VELOCIADES VERTIGINOSAS EN UNOS SEGUNDOS.

La nave giroscópica - Independencia Tecnológica (1/3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=643c2WYttZg

La nave giroscópica - Independencia Tecnológica (2/3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=wzBAkFbqGL0


La nave giroscópica - Independencia Tecnológica (3/3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=Z-WETyUqOIo

DEBIERA SER UN PROYECTO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y DESARROLLO OBLIGATORIO PARA LA FANB

Onyx escribió:EL VENEZOLANO IBRAHIM LÓPEZ INVENTO UN GIROSCOPO QUE TIENE LA MISMA IMAGEN DE LO QUE CONOCEMOS COMO PLATILLO VOLADOR, DESPEGA IN SITU, ALCANZA VELOCIADES VERTIGINOSAS EN UNOS SEGUNDOS.

La nave giroscópica - Independencia Tecnológica (1/3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=643c2WYttZg

La nave giroscópica - Independencia Tecnológica (2/3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=wzBAkFbqGL0


La nave giroscópica - Independencia Tecnológica (3/3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=Z-WETyUqOIo

DEBIERA SER UN PROYECTO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y DESARROLLO OBLIGATORIO PARA LA FANB

Muy intersante.
Gracias por traerlo aca.

http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=es&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dradar%2Bp18%26hl%3Des%26biw%3D1024%26bih%3D605%26prmd%3Dimvns&rurl=translate.google.co.ve&sl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.airspacemag.com/snapshot/138589809.html&usg=ALkJrhhYxlQnrcmrMfe5m8G-IC6NsoiojA

The State of the World: Explaining U.S. Strategy
By George Friedman

STRATFOR Inteligence Defence
February 28, 2012 | 1033 GMT
________________________________________


The fall of the Soviet Union ended the European epoch, the period in which European power dominated the world. It left the United States as the only global power, something for which it was culturally and institutionally unprepared. Since the end of World War II, the United States had defined its foreign policy in terms of its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Virtually everything it did around the world in some fashion related to this confrontation. The fall of the Soviet Union simultaneously freed the United States from a dangerous confrontation and eliminated the focus of its foreign policy.

In the course of a century, the United States had gone from marginal to world power. It had waged war or Cold War from 1917 until 1991, with roughly 20 years of peace between the two wars dominated by the Great Depression and numerous interventions in Latin America. Accordingly, the 20th century was a time of conflict and crisis for the United States. It entered the century without well-developed governmental institutions for managing its foreign policy. It built its foreign policy apparatus to deal with war and the threat of war; the sudden absence of an adversary inevitably left the United States off balance.

After the Cold War

The post-Cold War period can be divided into three parts. A simultaneous optimism and uncertainty marked the first, which lasted from 1992 until 2001. On one hand, the fall of the Soviet Union promised a period in which economic development supplanted war. On the other, American institutions were born in battle, so to speak, so transforming them for a time of apparently extended peace was not easy. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both pursued a policy built around economic growth, with periodic and not fully predictable military interventions in places such as Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo.

These interventions were not seen as critical to U.S. national security. In some cases, they were seen as solving a marginal problem, such as Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's drug trafficking. Alternatively, they were explained as primarily humanitarian missions. Some have sought a pattern or logic to these varied interventions; in fact, they were as random as they appeared, driven more by domestic politics and alliance pressures than any clear national purpose. U.S. power was so overwhelming that these interventions cost relatively little and risked even less.

The period where indulgences could be tolerated ended on Sept. 11, 2001. At that point, the United States faced a situation congruent with its strategic culture. It had a real, if unconventional, enemy that posed a genuine threat to the homeland. The institutions built up during and after World War II could function again effectively. In an odd and tragic way, the United States was back in its comfort zone, fighting a war it saw as imposed on it.

The period from 2001 until about 2007 consisted of a series of wars in the Islamic world. Like all wars, they involved brilliant successes and abject failures. They can be judged one of two ways. First, if the wars were intended to prevent al Qaeda from ever attacking the United States again in the fashion of 9/11, they succeeded. Even if it is difficult to see how the war in Iraq meshes with this goal, all wars involve dubious operations; the measure of war is success. If, however, the purpose of these wars was to create a sphere of pro-U.S. regimes, stable and emulating American values, they clearly failed.

By 2007 and the surge in Iraq, U.S. foreign policy moved into its present phase. No longer was the primary goal to dominate the region. Rather, it was to withdraw from the region while attempting to sustain regimes able to defend themselves and not hostile to the United States. The withdrawal from Iraq did not achieve this goal; the withdrawal from Afghanistan probably will not either. Having withdrawn from Iraq, the United States will withdraw from Afghanistan regardless of the aftermath. The United States will not end its involvement in the region, and the primary goal of defeating al Qaeda will no longer be the centerpiece.

President Barack Obama continued the strategy his predecessor, George W. Bush, set in Iraq after 2007. While Obama increased forces beyond what Bush did in Afghanistan, he nevertheless accepted the concept of a surge -- the increase of forces designed to facilitate withdrawal. For Obama, the core strategic problem was not the wars but rather the problem of the 1990s -- namely, how to accommodate the United States and its institutions to a world without major enemies.

The Failure of Reset

The reset button Hillary Clinton gave to the Russians symbolized Obama's strategy. Obama wanted to reset U.S. foreign policy to the period before 9/11, a period when U.S. interventions, although frequent, were minor and could be justified as humanitarian. Economic issues dominated the period, and the primary issue was managing prosperity. It also was a period in which U.S.-European and U.S.-Chinese relations fell into alignment, and when U.S.-Russian relations were stable. Obama thus sought a return to a period when the international system was stable, pro-American and prosperous. While understandable from an American point of view, Russia, for example, considers the 1990s an unmitigated disaster to which it must never return.

The problem in this strategy was that it was impossible to reset the international system. The prosperity of the 1990s had turned into the difficulties of the post-2008 financial crisis. This obviously created preoccupations with managing the domestic economy, but as we saw in our first installment, the financial crisis redefined the way the rest of the world operated. The Europe, China and Russia of the 1990s no longer existed, and the Middle East had been transformed as well.

During the 1990s, it was possible to speak of Europe as a single entity with the expectation that European unity would intensify. That was no longer the case by 2010. The European financial crisis had torn apart the unity that had existed in the 1990s, putting European institutions under intense pressure along with trans-Atlantic institutions such as NATO. In many ways, the United States was irrelevant to the issues the European Union faced. The Europeans might have wanted money from the Americans, but they did not want 1990s-style leadership.

China had also changed. Unease about the state of its economy had replaced the self-confidence of the elite that had dominated during the 1990s in China. Its exports were under heavy pressure, and concerns about social stability had increased. China also had become increasingly repressive and hostile, at least rhetorically, in its foreign policy.

In the Middle East, there was little receptivity to Obama's public diplomacy. In practical terms, the expansion of Iranian power was substantial. Given Israeli fears over Iranian nuclear weapons, Obama found himself walking a fine line between possible conflict with Iran and allowing events to take their own course.

Limiting Intervention

This emerged as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy. Where previously the United States saw itself as having an imperative to try to manage events, Obama clearly saw that as a problem. As seen in this strategy, the United States has limited resources that have been overly strained during the wars. Rather than attempting to manage foreign events, Obama is shifting U.S. strategy toward limiting intervention and allowing events to proceed on their own.

Strategy in Europe clearly reflects this. Washington has avoided any attempt to lead the Europeans to a solution even though the United States has provided massive assistance via the Federal Reserve. This strategy is designed to stabilize rather than to manage. With the Russians, who clearly have reached a point of self-confidence, the failure of an attempt to reset relations resulted in a withdrawal of U.S. focus and attention in the Russian periphery and a willingness by Washington to stand by and allow the Russians to evolve as they will. Similarly, whatever the rhetoric of China and U.S. discussions of redeployment to deal with the Chinese threat, U.S. policy remains passive and accepting.

It is in Iran that we see this most clearly. Apart from nuclear weapons, Iran is becoming a major regional power with a substantial sphere of influence. Rather than attempt to block the Iranians directly, the United States has chosen to stand by and allow the game to play out, making it clear to the Israelis that it prefers diplomacy over military action, which in practical terms means allowing events to take their own course.

This is not necessarily a foolish policy. The entire notion of the balance of power is built on the assumption that regional challengers confront regional opponents who will counterbalance them. Balance-of-power theory assumes the leading power intervenes only when an imbalance occurs. Since no intervention is practical in China, Europe or Russia, a degree of passivity makes sense. In the case of Iran, where military action against its conventional forces is difficult and against its nuclear facilities risky, the same logic applies.

In this strategy, Obama has not returned to the 1990s. Rather, he is attempting to stake out new ground. It is not isolationism in its classic sense, as the United States is now the only global power. He appears to be engineering a new strategy, acknowledging that many outcomes in most of the world are acceptable to the United States and that no one outcome is inherently superior or possible to achieve. The U.S. interest lies in resuming its own prosperity; the arrangements the rest of the world makes are, within very broad limits, acceptable.

Put differently, unable to return U.S. foreign policy to the 1990s and unwilling and unable to continue the post-9/11 strategy, Obama is pursuing a policy of acquiescence. He is decreasing the use of military force and, having limited economic leverage, allowing the system to evolve on its own.
Implicit in this strategy is the existence of overwhelming military force, particularly naval power.

Europe is not manageable through military force, and it poses the most serious long-term threat. As Europe frays, Germany's interests may be better served in a relationship with Russia. Germany needs Russian energy, and Russia needs German technology. Neither is happy with American power, and together they may limit it. Indeed, an entente between Germany and Russia was a founding fear of U.S. foreign policy from World War I until the Cold War. This is the only combination that could conceivably threaten the United States. The American counter here is to support Poland, which physically divides the two, along with other key allies in Europe, and the United States is doing this with a high degree of caution.
China is highly vulnerable to naval force because of the configuration of its coastal waters, which provides choke points for access to its shores. The ultimate Chinese fear is an American blockade, which the weak Chinese navy would be unable to counter, but this is a distant fear. Still, it is the ultimate American advantage.

Russia's vulnerability lies in the ability of its former fellow members of the Soviet Union, which it is trying to organize into a Eurasian Union, to undermine its post-Soviet agenda. The United States has not interfered in this process significantly, but it has economic incentives and covert influence it could use to undermine or at least challenge Russia. Russia is aware of these capabilities and that the United States has not yet used them.

The same strategy is in place with Iran. Sanctions on Iran are unlikely to work, as they are too porous and China and Russia will not honor them. Still, the United States pursues them not for what they will achieve but for what they will avoid -- namely, direct action. The assumption underlying U.S. quiescence, rhetoric aside, is that regional forces, the Turks in particular, will be forced to deal with the Iranians themselves, and that patience will allow a balance of power to emerge.

The Risks of Inaction

U.S. strategy under Obama is classic in the sense that it allows the system to evolve as it will, thereby allowing the United States to reduce its efforts. On the other hand, U.S. military power is sufficient that should the situation evolve unsatisfactorily, intervention and reversal is still possible. Obama has to fight the foreign policy establishment, particularly the U.S. Defense Department and intelligence community, to resist older temptations. He is trying to rebuild the foreign policy architecture away from the World War II-Cold War model, and that takes time.

The weakness in Obama's strategy is that the situation in many regions could suddenly and unexpectedly move in undesirable directions. Unlike the Cold War system, which tended to react too soon to problems, it is not clear that the current system won't take too long to react. Strategies create psychological frameworks that in turn shape decisions, and Obama has created a situation wherein the United States may not react quickly enough if the passive approach were to collapse suddenly.

It is difficult to see the current strategy as a permanent model. Before balances of power are created, great powers must ensure that a balance is possible. In Europe, within China, against Russia and in the Persian Gulf, it is not clear what the balance consists of. It is not obvious that the regional balance will contain emerging powers. Therefore, this is not a classic balance-of-power strategy. Rather it is an ad hoc strategy imposed by the financial crisis and its impact on psychology and by war-weariness. These issues cannot be ignored, but they do not provide a stable foundation for a long-term policy, which will likely replace the one Obama is pursuing now.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/state-world-explaining-us-strategy?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120228&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=9e96c08913fa4161a6aa40459c0a4230