Entrenadores

Arpia escribió:

vudu 1 escribió:A conformarse con k-8 que es lk unico q va a venir en cantidad para reemplazo de ov bronco para entrenar todo lo demas vetado y esperar que brasil soberanamente les de una ayuda al sistema tucano que tenemos

por el Bronco y AT-27 en el G-15 es lo mas logico por el momento y mandamos los valiosos Tucanos a tareas mas propias de entrenador ...

Arpia escribió:

vudu 1 escribió:A conformarse con k-8 que es lk unico q va a venir en cantidad para reemplazo de ov bronco para entrenar todo lo demas vetado y esperar que brasil soberanamente les de una ayuda al sistema tucano que tenemos

por el Bronco y AT-27 en el G-15 es lo mas logico por el momento y mandamos los valiosos Tucanos a tareas mas propias de entrenador ...

zuhe escribió:

XAMBER escribió:Tu estas hablando de l-159 aero vochody , que yo tenga entendido el L-39 es sovietico . Y tiene bastante historia ademas que yo sepa los pilotos rusos usaban los L-39 como escalon antes de montarse en los migs o en los Sukoi , en cambio los pilotos chinos creo que no hacen eso .

De todas formas lastima que los vetaron , el L-159 es un avion infinitamente mas capaz que el K-8 y hubiera sido una solucion inmediata no como el L-15 que hay que esperarlo .

No XAMBER los L-39 y todos sus derivados son de diseño y fabricación checa investiga antes un poco.

• Tripulación: 1 (piloto)
  
• Longitud: 12,72 m
  
• Envergadura: 9,54 m
  
• Altura: 4,87 m
  
• Peso vacío: 4.350 kg
  
• Peso máximo al despegue: 8.000 kg
  
• Planta motriz: 1× turbofán Honeywell/ITEC F124-GA-100.
  
  
  
  • Empuje normal: 28 kN 6.280 libras de empuje.
    
  
  

• Velocidad máxima operativa (V_no): 955 km/h
  
• Alcance: 1.570 km
  
• Techo de servicio: 13.200 m
  
• Régimen de ascenso: 68 m/s
  

• Armas de proyectiles: ZVI Plamen PL-20 20×102mm
  
• Puntos de anclaje: 7 (3 bajo cada ala, y 1 bajo el fuselaje) con una capacidad de 2.340 kg, para cargar una combinación de:
  
  
  
  • Bombas: varias guiadas y sin guiar
    
  • Misiles:
    
    
    
    • Aire-aire: AIM-9M Sidewinder, IRIS-T, AIM-132 ASRAAM
      
    • Aire-superficie: AGM-65 Maverick, AGM-88 HARM
      
    
    
  
  
  
  

• Tripulación: 2, piloto y copiloto entrenador
  
• Longitud: 11,6 m
  
• Envergadura: 9,63 m
  
• Altura: 4,21 m
  
• Peso vacío: 2.687 kg (5.922,1 lb)
  
• Peso máximo al despegue: 4.330 kg (9.543,3 lb)
  
• Planta motriz: 1× turbofán Garrett TFE731-2A-2A Ivchenko AI-25TLK (WS-11).
  
  
  
  • Empuje normal: 16 kN (1.633 kgf; 3.600 lbf) de empuje.
    
  
  

• Velocidad máxima operativa (V_no): 800 km/h (497 MPH; 432 kt)
  
• Radio de acción: 375 km (202 nmi; 233 mi)
  
• Alcance en ferry: 2.250 km (1.215 nmi; 1.398 mi)
  
• Techo de servicio: 13.000 m (42.651 ft)
  
• Régimen de ascenso: 58 m/s (11.417 ft/min)
  

• Cañones: 1× 23 mm cañon en barquilla (montado sobre el punto central del fuselaje).
  
• Puntos de anclaje: 5 con una capacidad de 1000 kg, para cargar una combinación de:
  
  
  
  • Bombas: 4× 250 kg de propósito general, bajo las alas.
    
  • Cohetes: 57 mm no guiados, capacidad de 12 cargas.
    
  • Misiles:
    
    
    
    • Misiles aire-aire:
      
      
      
      • PL-5 y PL-7
        
      
      
    
    
    
    
  
  
  • Otros: bombas: 200 kg, 250 kg bombas no guiadas, BL755 bombas cluster.
    

• Tripulación: 2 tripulantes: 1 piloto estudiante y 1 piloto
  instructor (modo de entrenador) o 1 piloto y 1 oficial para el control
  del sistema de armas
  
• Longitud: 12,27 m
  
• Envergadura: 9,48 m
  
• Altura: 4,81 m
  
• Peso vacío: 4.960 kg 6.500 kg
  
• Peso máximo al despegue: 9.500 kg
  
• Planta motriz: 2× turborreactores con post-combustión Ivchenko Progress/ AI-222K-25F.
  
  
  
  • Empuje normal: 49,42 kN de empuje cada uno.
    
  • Empuje con postquemador: 86,33 kN de empuje cada uno.
    
  
  

• Velocidad máxima operativa (V_no): 1,4 Mach; 1,6 versión de ataque ligero
  
• Alcance: 3.100 km
  
• Alcance en combate: 550 km
  
• Techo de servicio: 16.000 m
  

Zhue escribió:Bueno ya un avión como el bronco principalmente diseñado la lucha contra fuerzas irregulares ya no entra dentro de nuestra nueva doctrina del uso del poder aéreo, unos K-8 para la lucha contra el narcotráfico en tiempo de paz, en tiempo de conflicto para ataque ligero a tierra (como se usan los L-39 en Siria) y defensa puntual de bases aéreas es más adecuado.

Arpia escribió:

Zhue escribió:Bueno ya un avión como el bronco principalmente diseñado la lucha contra fuerzas irregulares ya no entra dentro de nuestra nueva doctrina del uso del poder aéreo, unos K-8 para la lucha contra el narcotráfico en tiempo de paz, en tiempo de conflicto para ataque ligero a tierra (como se usan los L-39 en Siria) y defensa puntual de bases aéreas es más adecuado.

Eso es muy discutible en el caso del Bronco, precisamente por los acontecimientos en Siria, son guerrilla y la guerrilla es guerrilla sea en una selva o urbana, el Bronco no solo es un avión contrainsurgencia si no también controlador aéreo avanzado eso no lo puedes hacer desde un K-8, Si salimos del Bronco es por viejo, pero no por malo o porque no hace falta, o por cambio de doctrina cuando precisamente las tácticas Asimétricas están a la orden del día y el Bronco encaja muy bien en ellas, además como esta visto, las últimas intervenciones armadas como Siria y Libia son guerras de baja intensidad en principio pero gracias a las intervenciones directa de países “Amigos” crecen y el conflicto se tiende a desbordar, la mayoría de los países afectados no tienen medios de contrainsurgencia adecuados para en primera instancia detener la semilla de las insurrección que se infiltra gota a gota por sus fronteras, por eso estos aviones son importantes al poder realizar patrullajes y mantenerse por más tiempo en zonas donde los jet no pueden, incluso para el narcotráfico porque siempre donde exista campos de droga se debe coordinar primero una escolta para los medios de transporte de tropas y posteriormente aviones con buena autonomía para mantenerse en el aire el mayor tiempo posible en espera en caso de ser llamados a la acción para dar apoyo, es por eso que aviones como el Bronco pueden ser invalorables, pero como dice la canción “todo llaga a su final María Luisa” … y los preciosos tucanos se requieren y son muy valiosos para entrenamiento estando los K-8 ya desplegados en el G-15 los Tucanos ya no deben tocar pito en esa orquesta, pero si en otras unidades y los pocos Broncos operativos pueden operar como controladores aéreos avanzados guiando a los K-8 para lanzar ataques o bien coordinar golpes de artillería si fuera necesario hasta su retiro final….

Y si lo que dices esta motivados por las conversaciones de Paz de los vecinos y si llegan a un acuerdo pues y ya no hace falta tropa y unidades contrainsurgencia con más razón va hacer falta algo como el Bronco, porque la Paz en Colombia es un pensamiento bonito pero desmovilizadas las FARC y el ELN le deja las manos libres a más de un “amigo de Venezuela” para usar el territorio colombiano e iniciar una primavera "Latinoamericana" empezando en nuestro país, así que el que crea que la Paz de Colombia es la Paz de Venezuela, es un ingenuo de primera clase, la Oligarquía Colombiana no da, ni hace concesiones, si no hay alguien más arriba que la presione para lograr sus intereses non santos ...

algo que sea barato de comprar , que vuele y que se barato de mantener . Va tomando forma la idea ? , para que garantize la soberania en el espacio aereo ya que los Su-30 y los F-16 no se les puede echar toda esa responsabilidad encima , deben ser complementados aunque sean fundamentales .

Y con una capacidad de ataque a tierra no tiene que ser la gran vaina , con pods designadores , armamento de precision etc ... Solo unos puntos duros en las alas y bombas tontas .

Arpia escribió:

Zhue escribió:Bueno ya un avión como el bronco principalmente diseñado la lucha contra fuerzas irregulares ya no entra dentro de nuestra nueva doctrina del uso del poder aéreo, unos K-8 para la lucha contra el narcotráfico en tiempo de paz, en tiempo de conflicto para ataque ligero a tierra (como se usan los L-39 en Siria) y defensa puntual de bases aéreas es más adecuado.

Eso es muy discutible en el caso del Bronco, precisamente por los acontecimientos en Siria, son guerrilla y la guerrilla es guerrilla sea en una selva o urbana, el Bronco no solo es un avión contrainsurgencia si no también controlador aéreo avanzado eso no lo puedes hacer desde un K-8, Si salimos del Bronco es por viejo, pero no por malo o porque no hace falta, o por cambio de doctrina cuando precisamente las tácticas Asimétricas están a la orden del día y el Bronco encaja muy bien en ellas, además como esta visto, las últimas intervenciones armadas como Siria y Libia son guerras de baja intensidad en principio pero gracias a las intervenciones directa de países “Amigos” crecen y el conflicto se tiende a desbordar, la mayoría de los países afectados no tienen medios de contrainsurgencia adecuados para en primera instancia detener la semilla de las insurrección que se infiltra gota a gota por sus fronteras, por eso estos aviones son importantes al poder realizar patrullajes y mantenerse por más tiempo en zonas donde los jet no pueden, incluso para el narcotráfico porque siempre donde exista campos de droga se debe coordinar primero una escolta para los medios de transporte de tropas y posteriormente aviones con buena autonomía para mantenerse en el aire el mayor tiempo posible en espera en caso de ser llamados a la acción para dar apoyo, es por eso que aviones como el Bronco pueden ser invalorables, pero como dice la canción “todo llaga a su final María Luisa” … y los preciosos tucanos se requieren y son muy valiosos para entrenamiento estando los K-8 ya desplegados en el G-15 los Tucanos ya no deben tocar pito en esa orquesta, pero si en otras unidades y los pocos Broncos operativos pueden operar como controladores aéreos avanzados guiando a los K-8 para lanzar ataques o bien coordinar golpes de artillería si fuera necesario hasta su retiro final….

XAMBER escribió:Si por que la industria Irani si es confiable .



Chamo que es un avion COIN y que es un avion cas ?

No nos importa por que basicamente son lo mismo y hacen lo mismo . El cas ( Su-25 , A-10 ) puede hacer Coin , MAS BIEN LO HACE MEJOR QUE CUALQUIER AVION COIN como el bronco o el tucano .


El Coin , vamos a poner a el Supertucano o a un Sf-.260 con puntos duros en las alas , perfectamente puede efectuar una mision DE APOYO AEREO CERCANO CAS .

Ahora por que nosotros nescesitamos un CAS y no un COIN ?
Mala pregunta , mas bien que es lo que nescesitamos .

Entrenadores = Para entrenar chatos .

Y algo que sea barato de comprar , que vuele y que se barato de mantener . Va tomando forma la idea ? , para que garantize la soberania en el espacio aereo ya que los Su-30 y los F-16 no se les puede echar toda esa responsabilidad encima , deben ser complementados aunque sean fundamentales .

Y con una capacidad de ataque a tierra no tiene que ser la gran vaina , con pods designadores , armamento de precision etc ... Solo unos puntos duros en las alas y bombas tontas .




Entonces como se llama eso :
Suenan tambores


PC-10 , SUPER TUCANO y K-8 cuadran con el perfil anteriormente presentado .

Ahora que pasa con los aviones CAS , por que existen los aviones CAS ? ... Por que en la guerra moderna usar aviones como el tucano que parecen de la segunda guerra mundial a realizar misiones de apoyo a tierra es un disparate o mejor dicho un piloto muerto seguro . Los aviones CAS , estan mejor protegidos , tienen mejor perfomance lo que le da mas autonomia , mas capacidad de carga util , mejores armas ( aunque el tucano sin ser CAS tambien se le han adaptado buenas armas ) . Claro que existen las excepciones que a los europeos y a los gringos este tipo de aviones no les sirvan pues no quiere decir que a nosotros que tenemos nuestras propias fuerzas armadas con nuestras propias hipotesis de conflicto y demas particularidades nos tenga que pasar lo mismo .

Incluso en los llamados conflictos de baja intensidad , los aviones como el supertucano o el pc-10 tienen mucha cabida . El ejemplo perfecto de esto es Colombia y su guerra , acuerdense de Raul Reyes muerto en Ecuador bueno esa mision la hicieron los supertucanos .

Entonces estoy diciendo que tenemos un conflicto de baja intensidad ?

NO

Que podemos tener ?

Que carajo tiene que ver ?

Estoy diciendo que segun nuestras hipotesis de conflicto y escenarios belicos este tipo de aviones CAS no valen la pena en costo beneficio .

Entoces vamos con el Su-25 un avion CAS . Para saber si lo nescesitamos y estando claro que nescesitamos un avion entrenador o que cumpla con los requisitos arriba expuestos ; ME CITO A MI MISMO .

algo que sea barato de comprar , que vuele y que se barato de mantener . Va tomando forma la idea ? , para que garantize la soberania en el espacio aereo ya que los Su-30 y los F-16 no se les puede echar toda esa responsabilidad encima , deben ser complementados aunque sean fundamentales .

Y con una capacidad de ataque a tierra no tiene que ser la gran vaina , con pods designadores , armamento de precision etc ... Solo unos puntos duros en las alas y bombas tontas .

Cuadra en esta descripcion el Su-25 , no y en la de entrenado avanzado que aunque existen versiones para eso no es la mejor opcion .

Por eso siempre he dicho que los Su-25 que vengan para la armada o para el ejercito . La aviacion tiene otras nescesidades .

nick7777 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

Zhue escribió:Bueno ya un avión como el bronco principalmente diseñado la lucha contra fuerzas irregulares ya no entra dentro de nuestra nueva doctrina del uso del poder aéreo, unos K-8 para la lucha contra el narcotráfico en tiempo de paz, en tiempo de conflicto para ataque ligero a tierra (como se usan los L-39 en Siria) y defensa puntual de bases aéreas es más adecuado.

Eso es muy discutible en el caso del Bronco, precisamente por los acontecimientos en Siria, son guerrilla y la guerrilla es guerrilla sea en una selva o urbana, el Bronco no solo es un avión contrainsurgencia si no también controlador aéreo avanzado eso no lo puedes hacer desde un K-8, Si salimos del Bronco es por viejo, pero no por malo o porque no hace falta, o por cambio de doctrina cuando precisamente las tácticas Asimétricas están a la orden del día y el Bronco encaja muy bien en ellas, además como esta visto, las últimas intervenciones armadas como Siria y Libia son guerras de baja intensidad en principio pero gracias a las intervenciones directa de países “Amigos” crecen y el conflicto se tiende a desbordar, la mayoría de los países afectados no tienen medios de contrainsurgencia adecuados para en primera instancia detener la semilla de las insurrección que se infiltra gota a gota por sus fronteras, por eso estos aviones son importantes al poder realizar patrullajes y mantenerse por más tiempo en zonas donde los jet no pueden, incluso para el narcotráfico porque siempre donde exista campos de droga se debe coordinar primero una escolta para los medios de transporte de tropas y posteriormente aviones con buena autonomía para mantenerse en el aire el mayor tiempo posible en espera en caso de ser llamados a la acción para dar apoyo, es por eso que aviones como el Bronco pueden ser invalorables, pero como dice la canción “todo llaga a su final María Luisa” … y los preciosos tucanos se requieren y son muy valiosos para entrenamiento estando los K-8 ya desplegados en el G-15 los Tucanos ya no deben tocar pito en esa orquesta, pero si en otras unidades y los pocos Broncos operativos pueden operar como controladores aéreos avanzados guiando a los K-8 para lanzar ataques o bien coordinar golpes de artillería si fuera necesario hasta su retiro final….

Y si lo que dices esta motivados por las conversaciones de Paz de los vecinos y si llegan a un acuerdo pues y ya no hace falta tropa y unidades contrainsurgencia con más razón va hacer falta algo como el Bronco, porque la Paz en Colombia es un pensamiento bonito pero desmovilizadas las FARC y el ELN le deja las manos libres a más de un “amigo de Venezuela” para usar el territorio colombiano e iniciar una primavera "Latinoamericana" empezando en nuestro país, así que el que crea que la Paz de Colombia es la Paz de Venezuela, es un ingenuo de primera clase, la Oligarquía Colombiana no da, ni hace concesiones, si no hay alguien más arriba que la presione para lograr sus intereses non santos ...

1)control aéreo avanzado con aviones en esta época ? ...no creo,el peso de esa misión ,que básicamente reconocimiento armado,la ejecutan hoy los UAV y drones,arriesgar un piloto y una aeronave en esta clase de misiones es algo del pasado para las fuerzas aéreas de primer orden,y en general,se trata de un concepto obsoleto en el mundo y en venezuela.
2)Guerrilla urbana no la vás a poder combatir con broncos ,su-25,a-10,en la era del manpad,acá los broncos lo único que consiguieron es ser derribados,unos con RBS-70(vshorad),otros por artillería de f-16.
¿guerrilla en el monte?,ahí están las farc,pese a todos los ov-10,supertucanos,etc..

3)Algo como el bronco no nos vá a servir de nada,algo como los k-8,L-15 y sukhoi,si nos ván a servir.

Arpia escribió:

nick7777 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

Eso es muy discutible en el caso del Bronco, precisamente por los acontecimientos en Siria, son guerrilla y la guerrilla es guerrilla sea en una selva o urbana, el Bronco no solo es un avión contrainsurgencia si no también controlador aéreo avanzado eso no lo puedes hacer desde un K-8, Si salimos del Bronco es por viejo, pero no por malo o porque no hace falta, o por cambio de doctrina cuando precisamente las tácticas Asimétricas están a la orden del día y el Bronco encaja muy bien en ellas, además como esta visto, las últimas intervenciones armadas como Siria y Libia son guerras de baja intensidad en principio pero gracias a las intervenciones directa de países “Amigos” crecen y el conflicto se tiende a desbordar, la mayoría de los países afectados no tienen medios de contrainsurgencia adecuados para en primera instancia detener la semilla de las insurrección que se infiltra gota a gota por sus fronteras, por eso estos aviones son importantes al poder realizar patrullajes y mantenerse por más tiempo en zonas donde los jet no pueden, incluso para el narcotráfico porque siempre donde exista campos de droga se debe coordinar primero una escolta para los medios de transporte de tropas y posteriormente aviones con buena autonomía para mantenerse en el aire el mayor tiempo posible en espera en caso de ser llamados a la acción para dar apoyo, es por eso que aviones como el Bronco pueden ser invalorables, pero como dice la canción “todo llaga a su final María Luisa” … y los preciosos tucanos se requieren y son muy valiosos para entrenamiento estando los K-8 ya desplegados en el G-15 los Tucanos ya no deben tocar pito en esa orquesta, pero si en otras unidades y los pocos Broncos operativos pueden operar como controladores aéreos avanzados guiando a los K-8 para lanzar ataques o bien coordinar golpes de artillería si fuera necesario hasta su retiro final….

Y si lo que dices esta motivados por las conversaciones de Paz de los vecinos y si llegan a un acuerdo pues y ya no hace falta tropa y unidades contrainsurgencia con más razón va hacer falta algo como el Bronco, porque la Paz en Colombia es un pensamiento bonito pero desmovilizadas las FARC y el ELN le deja las manos libres a más de un “amigo de Venezuela” para usar el territorio colombiano e iniciar una primavera "Latinoamericana" empezando en nuestro país, así que el que crea que la Paz de Colombia es la Paz de Venezuela, es un ingenuo de primera clase, la Oligarquía Colombiana no da, ni hace concesiones, si no hay alguien más arriba que la presione para lograr sus intereses non santos ...

1)control aéreo avanzado con aviones en esta época ? ...no creo,el peso de esa misión ,que básicamente reconocimiento armado,la ejecutan hoy los UAV y drones,arriesgar un piloto y una aeronave en esta clase de misiones es algo del pasado para las fuerzas aéreas de primer orden,y en general,se trata de un concepto obsoleto en el mundo y en venezuela.
2)Guerrilla urbana no la vás a poder combatir con broncos ,su-25,a-10,en la era del manpad,acá los broncos lo único que consiguieron es ser derribados,unos con RBS-70(vshorad),otros por artillería de f-16.
¿guerrilla en el monte?,ahí están las farc,pese a todos los ov-10,supertucanos,etc..

3)Algo como el bronco no nos vá a servir de nada,algo como los k-8,L-15 y sukhoi,si nos ván a servir.

A Nick Y a Zhue, A si y es que nos han vetado los A-29 , porque creen?... porque los gringos decidieron por nosotros que los drones están de moda pero la pregunta no es porque lo vetan si no porque nosotros queríamos comprarlo?, si solo por entrenadores, seguramente(Sarcasmo) y de paso como 36 aparatos muy bien o solo para darle matarile a algo como el Bronco y complementar a los T-27, sabiendo como lo pasan de rico a pesar del coñazo de drones que los gringos tienen en Afganistán, a pesar de que los ST ganaron una licitación en EEUU y tuvo que competir con él un viejo conocido, que los gringos se echaron para atrás es otra cosa... pero un avión contrainsurgencia y de control aéreo avanzado y COIN están más vigentes que nunca, es así, les guste o no...

Lamentablemente Nick vives en un país cuyas fuerzas armadas libraron una guerra de guerrillas y ganaron así sea por métodos non santos y sin ninguna gloria, pero ganaron, acuérdate que tanto el Bronco como un F-16 dan apoyo a las tropas de tierra, pero son ellas las que conquistan y ocupan el terreno, estos aviones y sus pilotos no ganan la guerra solitos al igual que todos, si los Colocos tienen 60 años peleando con sus A-29, Broncos, Fantamass y toda la parafernalia contrainsurgencia y tecnológica incluidos sus soldados universales y no están ni cerca de ganar, ese es su peo... la otra es... creen que el G-15 y sus pilotos en todos los años que tiene volando el Bronco con todas las tropas que Venezuela tiene en la frontera Colombiana juegan truco mientras se libra una guerra de guerrilla en un país vecino, si esto fuera así créanme ya la guerra hubiera traspasado las fronteras y se pelearía en pueblos del Táchira, Apure y el Zulia, pero no... ,

Los omnipresentes drones que operan en zonas donde no existe defensas antiaéreas, ni aviones que los cace, pero que tal que si… ¿Sabían qué? los Colocos en su periplo por Red Flag se ejercitaron para cazar drones y negar datos de inteligencia al potencial enemigo, obviamente pensando en nosotros ya que según er comandante tenemos la máquina de hacer churros montada, pues yo sé y ustedes saben que cazar drones con Kfeteras no es eficientes a menos que sea algo como un Global Hawk, pero ellos llevan la experiencia a casa para cazar drones con sus A-29 y Broncos, esto esta igualito para nosotros, pero si eliminan nuestros ojos en el aire, ¿Quién cree que va a ver lo que pasa en tierra? Pues por su puesto lo más barato dependiendo del tipo de aeronave y lo mejor es usar lo que nos ha funcionado siempre AVIONES Y PILOTOS EN EL AIRE y eso es un Bronquito, mirando, atacando y coordinando a otros aviones como el K-8 …

Chao….

zuhe escribió:Saludos


Todo indica que los L-39 han resultado ser muy resolutivos para fuerza aérea de Siria en su lucha contra   los combatientes del  ELS o contras una secuencia de fotos como ejemplo. Nuestros K-8 también pueden realizar esa maniobras, su número debe aumentar a unos 36 a 48 aviones





En cuanto a los supertucanos arpia quienes disidieron proponer su compra son los mismo oficiales que se opusieron dos veces a la compra de los K-8 (una vez en la época de la cuarta cuando nos lo ofreció pakistan y la primera vez que sabotearon su compra cuando lo ofreció China en época de la quinta ( era un paquete de 50 K-8 + Y-12 + un avión agrícola), fue después de plaza altamira y los intento de golpe cuando en una tercera oportunidad fue la vencida y se compro el K-8.

nos han vetado los A-29 , ¿porque creen?

nick7777 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

nick7777 escribió:

1)control aéreo avanzado con aviones en esta época ? ...no creo,el peso de esa misión ,que básicamente reconocimiento armado,la ejecutan hoy los UAV y drones,arriesgar un piloto y una aeronave en esta clase de misiones es algo del pasado para las fuerzas aéreas de primer orden,y en general,se trata de un concepto obsoleto en el mundo y en venezuela.
2)Guerrilla urbana no la vás a poder combatir con broncos ,su-25,a-10,en la era del manpad,acá los broncos lo único que consiguieron es ser derribados,unos con RBS-70(vshorad),otros por artillería de f-16.
¿guerrilla en el monte?,ahí están las farc,pese a todos los ov-10,supertucanos,etc..

3)Algo como el bronco no nos vá a servir de nada,algo como los k-8,L-15 y sukhoi,si nos ván a servir.

A Nick Y a Zhue, A si y es que nos han vetado los A-29 , porque creen?... porque los gringos decidieron por nosotros que los drones están de moda pero la pregunta no es porque lo vetan si no porque nosotros queríamos comprarlo?, si solo por entrenadores, seguramente(Sarcasmo) y de paso como 36 aparatos muy bien o solo para darle matarile a algo como el Bronco y complementar a los T-27, sabiendo como lo pasan de rico a pesar del coñazo de drones que los gringos tienen en Afganistán, a pesar de que los ST ganaron una licitación en EEUU y tuvo que competir con él un viejo conocido, que los gringos se echaron para atrás es otra cosa... pero un avión contrainsurgencia y de control aéreo avanzado y COIN están más vigentes que nunca, es así, les guste o no...

Lamentablemente Nick vives en un país cuyas fuerzas armadas libraron una guerra de guerrillas y ganaron así sea por métodos non santos y sin ninguna gloria, pero ganaron, acuérdate que tanto el Bronco como un F-16 dan apoyo a las tropas de tierra, pero son ellas las que conquistan y ocupan el terreno, estos aviones y sus pilotos no ganan la guerra solitos al igual que todos, si los Colocos tienen 60 años peleando con sus A-29, Broncos, Fantamass y toda la parafernalia contrainsurgencia y tecnológica incluidos sus soldados universales y no están ni cerca de ganar, ese es su peo... la otra es... creen que el G-15 y sus pilotos en todos los años que tiene volando el Bronco con todas las tropas que Venezuela tiene en la frontera Colombiana juegan truco mientras se libra una guerra de guerrilla en un país vecino, si esto fuera así créanme ya la guerra hubiera traspasado las fronteras y se pelearía en pueblos del Táchira, Apure y el Zulia, pero no... ,

Los omnipresentes drones que operan en zonas donde no existe defensas antiaéreas, ni aviones que los cace, pero que tal que si… ¿Sabían qué? los Colocos en su periplo por Red Flag se ejercitaron para cazar drones y negar datos de inteligencia al potencial enemigo, obviamente pensando en nosotros ya que según er comandante tenemos la máquina de hacer churros montada, pues yo sé y ustedes saben que cazar drones con Kfeteras no es eficientes a menos que sea algo como un Global Hawk, pero ellos llevan la experiencia a casa para cazar drones con sus A-29 y Broncos, esto esta igualito para nosotros, pero si eliminan nuestros ojos en el aire, ¿Quién cree que va a ver lo que pasa en tierra? Pues por su puesto lo más barato dependiendo del tipo de aeronave y lo mejor es usar lo que nos ha funcionado siempre AVIONES Y PILOTOS EN EL AIRE y eso es un Bronquito, mirando, atacando y coordinando a otros aviones como el K-8 …

Chao….

¿Porqué nos vetaron?,¿aparte de el discurso del líder?,pues obviamente,para fastidiarnos y degradar todos nuestros sistemas de armas,te recuerdo dos cosas,para la época en que acá se planteó esa compra en la fuerza aérea,existía un real problema con el asunto de las guerrillas colombitches,y,además,la tecnología del uav y el ucav,no estaban tan desarrolladas.

La segunda cosa es que no estoy suponiendo"que tal si",un UAV nuestro lo caza un supertucano de ellos(la razón del supertucano en la FAC,es COIN,no te pongas a inventar bergas raras),si insistes en elucubrar,te dejo la misma:"que tal si",un k-8 nuestro revienta al bronco o supertucano?,te llamo a usar la lógica con esto:un UAV con una RCS mínima al radar enemigo,volando a 80km/h,¿llamaría la atención a la defensa aérea colombiana?,otra pregunta lógica:dado que nuestros uav son para reconocimiento dentro de nuestras fronteras:¿colombia enviará a un supertucano a nuestro espacio aéreo para buscar una vaina que parece un pájaro en el radar?,otra pregunta aún más lógica:¿como hace un radar tps-63 o 70 narcolombitch,para detectar unuav que vuele a 200-300 metros de altura?:por la curva de la tierra,y por la ubicación de tales radares,no lo detectaría.
Lo otro:los estados unidos pueden y deben mantener aeronaves COIN,nosotros no tenemos guerrillas en la selva,si no existe la necesidad,no nos sirve.

Y de verdad vale,con razón se arrechaba faust:se ponen a opinar de misiones cas y coin y ni siquiera goglean para ver de que vamos a opinar, la diferencia de una con otra ,ni los tipos de aeronaves que las ejecutaban,uno hace la tarea,les dá la explicación,les dice ,en base a la historia militar de los recientes y no recientes conflictos el porqué no se puede hacer lo mismo hoy,y no responden con un argumento;porque las cosas que detallé no son porque uno lo opine así o asao ,sinó que son las mismas razones que llevaron a los expertos de esos países a desarrollar una doctrina COIN diferente,pero señores,para saberlo,hay que leerlo,sinó tomamos en cuenta las diferencias y particularidades del contexto en que se desenvuelve una fuerza militar injerencista y el contexto nuestro,sinó conocemos y entendemos los conceptos vamos a pensar de verdad que se trata de los gustos de nick,cito:"aunque a nick y a zuhe no le guste",no se trata de gustos,se trata de ARGUMENTOS,y uno espera de gente que piensa bien como el estimado pajarraco,argumentos más sólidos para poder desechar los propios..porque amigo,eso que usted colocó,no lo puedo contrastar con nada de lo que escribí.saludos.

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR)

In February 2012, the USAF announced that its FY13 budget proposal would end funding for both the Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) and the Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA) programs.

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program was to acquire an aircraft with modifications to satisfy the requirement for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance, and advanced aircraft training for irregular warfare operations in support of building partnership capacity for lesser developed partner nations. This program would provide a continental US-based capability to support irregular warfare efforts that help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating a light armed and reconnaissance capability that was consistent with their needs for supporting infrastructure, performance, anticipated methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and multi-role/multi-mission capability. LAAR was for training US pilots to train partner nation pilots, not for USAF combat employment.

The LAAR program grew out of the premise that countries in which the United States had a strategic interest were often in need of a platform that could provide conventional attack and limited reconnaissance capabilities, but were restricted economically from purchasing and maintaining conventional weapons systems in the US Air Force inventory. While such requirements for the nascent Iraqi Air Force subsequently disappeared, there was a need for such an aircraft in Afghanistan.

In addition, the USAF developed a requirement for a similar type of aircraft on which to train advisory personnel. The LAAR program was limited acquiring aircraft to provide an organic capability to train USAF advisory personnel for potential foreign security assistance missions. This would allow advisors to train on a type of aircraft similar that which would be common to foreign militaries, or supplied to them by the US. The LAAR aircraft were to have no combat role within the USAF.

In July 2009, the USAF issued a Capability Request for Information (CFRI) for an aircraft that would integrate with traditional command and control concepts and organizations and existing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Mission planning would require access to theater air tasking order and airspace control order dissemination networks. The Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft might be tasked as part of a joint team and would require communication capabilities to coordinate with supported and/or supporting units. LAAR platforms would employ a modular structure capable of interfacing with multiple weapons and sensors to tailor configuration to tasking and have robust, integrated sensors used to find, fix, track, and target within a single asset. For LAAR platforms, aerial gunnery and precision weapons would provide the ability to engage targets quickly, thus reducing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. LAAR platforms would also have the ability to coordinate fires directly with supported ground units through voice, video, and data links with other assets to create synergies and minimize fratricide.

The USAF's Aeronautical Systems Center issued the CFRI to determine the most cost-effective acquisition strategy to fulfill the need for 100 LAAR fixed-wing aircraft with deliveries starting in FY12 and an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY13. All proposed systems would be USAF Military certified and flown by military pilots. Existing Air Combat Command (ACC) facilities were to be used for aircraft storage and maintenance and USAF organic organizational-level maintenance would be established by the IOC date of FY13. Depot level maintenance was to be provided by the selected contractor.

In addition to the USAF requirement for the LAAR, it was also seen as having the potential for foreign sales as part of military assistance programs. The FY10 Foreign Military Financing spending plan for Lebanon, as submitted to Congress by the State Department, included $10 million for sustainment and repair of existing equipment, $14 million for acquisition of air, ground, and naval systems, $36 million for personal equipment, weapons, and ammunition and $40 million for close air support. The plan included the provision of LAAR aircraft that, according to the Defense Department, would provide the Lebanese Air Force with the capabilities to perform border security aerial surveillance and target acquisition. This military assistance component subsequently became the Light Air Support program (LAS).

After the formal establishment of the USAF LAS effort, it was expected that the LAAR program would leverage the LAS indefinite deliveries/indefinite quantities contract as a priced option if the technical requirements were validated to mirror the effort. Award follow-on task order for the LAAR aircraft was estimated to be December 2011 as of February 2011.

In the FY12 Defense Budget, the acquisition of the LAAR by the Secretary of the Air Force for Air Force inventory to be used in connection with training foreign military and other security forces was approved. However, the acquisition was limited so that, except as provided, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for FY12 could be obligated or expended for the procurement or fielding of the LAAR until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submitted to the congressional defense committees a report containing the findings of a review carried out by the Secretary of the capability of the elements of the Department of Defense that were responsible for conducting LAAR missions or fulfilling requests of partner nations for training in the conduct of such missions. The Secretary of Defense's report was to identify any gaps in the ability of the Department of Defense to conduct LAAR missions or to fulfill requests of partner nations for training in the conduct of such missions; identify any unnecessary duplication of efforts between the elements of the Department of Defense to procure or field aircraft to conduct LAAR missions or to fulfill requests of partner nations to train in the conduct of such missions, including any planned developmental efforts, operational evaluations, or acquisition of such aircraft through procurement or lease; and include findings and recommendations the Secretary of Defense considered appropriate to address any gaps or unnecessary duplication of efforts identified as part of the review. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/laar.htm

Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance
All the armed services have had to rethink and retool assets in light of asymmetrical conflicts, or irregular warfare (IW). For example, in the Navy, that has meant the increased use of Fast Boats and riverine attack craft. In the air, during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, air operations have seen the incalculable value of unmanned aerial vehicles that can now offer surveillance as well as strike capabilities.

The air force is currently looking at another asset that should prove valuable in IW situations that require more punch than a UAV, but are not appropriate for large manned fighters. These planes are designated as light attack armed reconnaissance (LAAR) and they are creating quite a buzz.

Recently the Air Force put out a capability request for information (CRFI) through its Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) based at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. The purpose of the CRFI was to explore the feasibility and possible purchase of 100 LAARs, with delivery to begin by 2012 and a full squadron in the air by 2013.

According to the CRFI, the USAF is “conducting a market research assessment of fixed wing platforms available for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance and advanced aircraft training in support of irregular warfare operations.” LAAR needs to be able to fill more than an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) role. They will need to be designed to acquire and fully engage targets as well.

The solicitation for feasibility calls for a two-seat turboprop that can fly as high as 30,000 feet, has full motion video cameras, and a data link that will interface with all existing ISR infrastructure. The airplane needs to be able to conduct precision aerial gunnery and combat maneuvers, and be equipped with two 500 pound bombs, 2.75-inch rockets and rail-launched munitions in addition to its guns. The LAAR also must possess an infrared suppressor and other countermeasures such as a radar-warning receiver, and the cockpit must be armored. The plane should also be equipped with zero-altitude/zero-airspeed ejection seats as well.

Among the front runners expected to meet these requirements are the Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, the Air Tractor AT-802U, Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano, and the Pilatus PC-9 Trainer.

“The Super Tucano complies with most of the LAAR requirements, since it was developed from the ground to perform both training and light attack/COIN, close air support, border surveillance and armed ISR missions, as well as training missions and has been performing those missions very successfully,” said Acir Luiz de Almeida Padilha Jr., vice president marketing and sales, defense market. “Nevertheless, each client requires some specific customizations, which the Super Tucano can meet because of the flexible avionics architecture and the power, cooling and space available for new systems integration. This growth capacity and flexibility also allows us to integrate new weapons according to specific customer requirements.”

“We can say that our advantage over the competition is that we already have a battle proven product, with demonstrated capabilities flying in five different air forces. We have what the ground forces needs available now,” Padilha continued.

“The Super Tucano is the only operational aircraft that was developed from the ground for this mission,” said Padilha. “It has the highest weapons load in its class—3,400 pounds—and already has more than 40 external load configurations cleared, including dumb and intelligent weapons, 70 mm rockets, cluster bombs and air-to-air missiles. Another important feature is the EO/ IR sensors integrated with the weapons systems, with laser designation capacity. And above all, it’s has been proved in combat.”

The AT-802U is designed to provide inexpensive and prolonged ISR, logistic resupply, and force application capability to ground force commanders. It is based on the armored version of Air Tractor’s 16,000 pound gross weight AT-802 agricultural aircraft that has been supplied to the U.S. Department of State for narcotic crop eradication in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

“This armored AT-802 serves as a great starting point for the LAAR platform, said Lee Jackson, Air Tractor design engineer. “It is a two seat, dual control aircraft that can serve in a tactical training role as well as an operational role.”

According to the company, the AT-802U is combat ready with a fully integrated MX-15Di sensor turret that is capable of laser target designation, compact multiband data link that can stream real-time imagery and metadata, and an operational dual GAU-19/A .50 caliber gun system with over 2,700 rounds of ammunition. The aircraft has six wing hard points rated at over 600 pounds each and three centerline hard points rated at 1,000 pounds each. With an additional fuel tank, the aircraft has about ten hours of endurance. “We are so excited about the great interest that our aircraft has drawn from not only the special operations community but from partnering nations to the U.S. who are seeking a robust, inexpensive, and capable aircraft to protect and support their national interests,” said Jackson.

The HBC AT-6B is being developed as a joint venture with Lockheed Martin specifically to enter the LAAR competition. In a company press release, Hawker Beechcraft Chairman and CEO Bill Boisture said, “This teaming agreement marks a big step forward in working to meet the Air Force’s emerging irregular warfare needs. By teaming with Lockheed Martin, we will deliver an AT-6 LAAR aircraft that meets the training and light attack capabilities the Air Force needs in one flexible platform. The AT-6 is a low-risk, low-cost solution that complements existing combat aircraft capabilities and will contribute to the Air Force’s building partner capacity initiatives around the world.”

“The Hawker Beechcraft and Lockheed Martin team bring together the best of both worlds: a proven platform and a proven mission system integration capability,” added Marillyn Hewson, president of Lockheed Martin Systems Integration.

Light attack aircraft have the advantage of being able to launch from austere forward positions, and will not require fully paved runways for takeoff or landing. They will be able to remain aloft for several hours, and being armored and equipped with various sophisticated countermeasures, LAARs will be able to survive most threats from ground fire. They can also be specially outfitted for operations in mountainous terrains—all in all, a profile that should make the LAAR fleet, once it is established, particularly appealing to the special ops community.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG INTERDICTION

Much like their nautical counterparts’ riverine combat craft and fast boats, light attack aircraft have already proven themselves in law enforcement or drug interdiction operations.

Operating as a division of the U.S. State Department, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ Office of Aviation (INL/A) is charged with the mission of cutting off the supply of illicit drugs from foreign sources to the U.S.

Air operations by the bureau include aerial eradication of poppy fields and other drug crops, interdiction of refining laboratories and smuggling activities, and other law enforcement operations. The bureau operates some 340 fixed wing and rotary wing assets, including several that would be designated as light attack aircraft, that have flown successful counternarcotics missions in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Assets flown by INL/A include Air Tractor’s AT-802, armed and armored crop duster, and they have flown missions in conjunction with Embraer’s Super Tucanos flown by Brazilian and Columbian pilots.

ECONOMIES OF “SCALE”

It is not only tactics that are driving the need for light attack craft. The USAF is interested in combating the threats posed by insurgency and IW, with a solution that can be more cost-effective than a fully equipped jet fighter or a complex UAV system.

DoD has shown increased interest in purchasing these kinds of light attack aircraft, such as the armed crop dusters proved effective in the war on drugs, as commercial off-the-shelf deliverables requiring little or no modification for military operations.

According to Charles Vanderberg, acquisition program manager, light attack aircraft with ASC, “If the USAF decides to pursue an acquisition program, then a materiel development decision (MDD) would determine where in the DoD acquisition process the program would enter, either the engineering and manufacturing development phase if systems development is needed, or the production and deployment phase if a non-development item is suitable for the needed capability. If a MDD for LAAR occurs by September 2010, we would plan for earliest possible delivery by late FY13 or early FY14.”

Besides the current CRFI put out by ASC, the U.S. Navy is already evaluating an up-armed version of the Super Tucano under a classified testing program known as ‘Imminent Fury.’ Imminent Fury is currently testing a single aircraft, but the Navy is seeking a budget of $44 million to expand the program. The Special Operations Command, Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps are also interested in employing off-the-shelf air assets for lowintensity ISR with fast strike capability, and have expressed interest in the Armed Super Tucanos currently operated by Brazil, Columbia and the Dominican Republic.

The Air National Guard has also announced that it will enter into an evaluation of the Beechcraft AT-6 Texan II later this year. The USAF, while not committing to the purchase of a LAAR fleet yet, is ordering dozens of AT-6s on behalf of the rebuilding Iraqi air force.

EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN

In many ways, light attack aircraft are a modern day throwback to the powerful turbo prop fighters of yesteryear. Boeing recently confirmed that it is seriously considering reviving the Vietnam- era OV-10 Bronco program as a possible entry into the LAAR CRFI mix. Currently designated OV-10-X, the twinengine plane would maintain much of its 1960s-vintage rugged exterior, but the 21st century version will feature a computerized glass cockpit, ISR sensor arrays and smart bomb-dropping capabilities.

Chuck Burin, one of the founders and the current chairman of the board of the OV-10 Bronco Association (OBA) and who flew the venerable aircraft in Vietnam, thinks revamping the program would be a great idea. “The OV-10 is an aircraft that is ideal for what they need in a low-threat environment,” said Burin. “It is a proven concept.”

In fact, several years ago Burin said that a congressional representative who was trying to find out the status of available old OV-10’s approached him. His answer was—unfortunately—“ not so many.” While the Bronco is a proven platform that could fulfill the LAAR requirements, there are not enough existing airframes to upgrade. So if Boeing pursues this avenue, they will have to rebuild new aircraft. Said Burin, “You’re going to have to build a totally new aircraft, because there are just no old ones available. As far as I know the original tooling is still available—the wings will have to be beefed up to carry more weaponry, as will the engines, but I see no major problems getting the Bronco to meet the mission specs for LAAR.”

Several foreign militaries are still flying the Bronco, and incidentally, INL/A operates original OV-10 Broncos as part of their drug interdiction wing.

The light attack/armed reconnaissance fleet, if finally approved, would join a growing COIN air force within an air force. The USAF has already purchased 37 Hawker Beechcraft MC-12Ws to serve as manned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, filling a role previously served almost exclusively by UAVs—attesting to what special forces have always known: that when it comes to irregular warfare, the man is as important as the machine. http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-home/233-sotech-2010-volume-8-issue-2-march/2669-light-attack-armed-reconnaissance.html

The LAAR Lightweight Combat Aircraft Is Coming to the Air Force
A small, nimble warplane – an economical featherweight compared to robust combat aircraft like the 40-ton F-15E Strike Eagle – now enjoys a high priority on the Air Force’s shopping list as the service remakes itself for counter-insurgency conflicts.

Under the OA-X program begun in September 2008, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz is pushing toward an eventual, $2 billion purchase of up to 100 Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft. The LAAR is likely to be a turboprop aircraft and will be part of mainstream Air Force operations. Air Combat Command (ACC) is performing developmental work rather than, as might be expected in an unorthodox effort, Air Force Special Operations Command.

One observer, given a glimpse of ACC’s capabilities-based assessment conducted in 2009, made the comment that, “this looks a lot like World War II.” That was a reference to the likely airframe and the guns and bombs it will carry, not to the 21st century digital avionics ACC expects to pack inside. An ACC official responded: “Yeah. We get that a lot.”

Among aircraft being proposed are the AirTractor AT802U (a modified crop duster, demonstrated at the 2009 Paris Air Show), Alenia M346, Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, and Pilatus PC-6 Porter. Pentagon officials say LAAR must be derived from an “in production” aircraft design. Boeing, however, is proposing an OV-10(X) Bronco, based on the twin-engine, twin-boom forward air control aircraft of the Vietnam era, which the planemaker would return to production at a facility not yet chosen.

The Air Force wants a “kinetic,” or rapid engagement, capability that, it says, “will reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline cycle.” The LAAR aircraft will also function as a digital-era forward air controller, coordinating fire directly with supported ground units through voice, video and datalinks – and minimizing the danger of blue-on-blue or “friendly fire” incidents.

One reason for LAAR and the OA-X program: operating cost. The Air Force wants an aircraft that can fly one combat hour for $1,000. A combat flight hour costs $7,750 for an F-16C Fighting Falcon and fully $44,000 for an F-15E Strike Eagle.

Typical air-to-ground ordnance for LAAR will include one or two podded 7.62-mm. mini-guns, two 500-pound guided-munitions, 2.75-inch rocket projectiles and the AGM-114N Hellfire air-to-ground missile. A “needs” document that does not yet have formal status calls for operating from austere airfields on five-hour missions over distances of 900 nautical miles up to a ceiling of 30,000 feet.

In its short-term plans for the new aircraft, the Air Force plans to purchase 15 examples in fiscal year 2011. ACC wants a 24-aircraft squadron ready for combat within two years and will then decide whether to equip an entire wing. If the program grows as expected, many of the aircraft will be assigned to Air National Guard units.

Last November, Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan) and Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stating concerns with reports that the United States and Brazil are negotiating for acquisition of Super Tucanos. Brownback and Tiahrt, strong defenders of the Wichita-built AT-6B, argued that such an agreement would “demean the integrity of the federal acquisition process” and cost thousands of American jobs.

Closely related to the OA-X program and the LAAR aircraft, the Navy is November 2009 launched Imminent Fury, a demonstrator program with a leased Super Tucano, designated A-29B in Pentagon parlance. The purpose: special operations support for SEAL teams in the field. The Imminent Fury aircraft is equipped with an electro-optical sensor in a nose turret and satellite and secure communications systems. According to one source, the Navy leased the Super Tucano from EP Aviation, a subsidiary of the contractor Xe Security, formerly Blackwater International.
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-laar-lightweight-combat-aircraft-is-coming-to-the-air-force/

“Guns Guns Guns”
The continuing saga of the US and light attack aircraft
By Ed Timperlake


03/02/2011- In a practice air-to-air engagement, when one fighter closed on his opponent inside of the missile envelope to put the gun sight piper on the adversary, a call goes out “guns guns guns.” This is a blunt fighter pilot way of saying “your dead!” In real life, the aircraft’s machine guns or cannons will do the actual “speaking”, as the above video from a shoot down in South America shows. This video shows the aggressive and very successful use of a Tucano, which now is in consideration for use in combat in Afghanistan.

In a practice air-to-air engagement, when one fighter closed on his opponent inside of the missile envelope to put the gun sight piper on the adversary, a call goes out “guns guns guns.” This is a blunt fighter pilot way of saying “your dead!” In real life, the aircraft’s machine guns or cannons will do the actual “speaking”…

There is currently a competition to provide for a Light Combat Aircraft for the Afghan forces being trained by the USAF. But is interesting to ask why does the USAF need a competition in any case, given that there is only one battle tested competitor flying today. General Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has recently and forcefully stressed that industry should not be blowing smoke by laying off risk with over promising and sliding on delivery [1]. With that forceful philosophy it is amazing that the Super Tucano a proven aircraft isn’t already in Afghanistan. The shoot down is a demonstration of versatility of the air-to-air capability of the Tucano, now upgraded to Super Tucano. For Afghanistan, the truly important combat reality is the fact that the Colombian Air Force is having noteworthy success in the air-to-ground attack mode (AG) [2].

An LAA/LAS/LAAR For “End-Game Afghanistan” ?
Before any further discussion of roles and missions for an Afghanistan “light attack” aircraft can proceed, various definitions of what is being discussed must be clarified. The two planes in competition, a piloted turbo-prop like the AT-6 “Texan” and A-29 Super Tucano have been called a Light Attack Aircraft (LAA), a Light Attack Surveillance (LAS) aircraft and a Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft. These distinctions only become important when discussing the names given by DOD for awarding various technology contracts.

For example, a recent fly off between the Hawker Beech AT-6 and Embraer Super Tucano to select the appropriate combat aircraft for the emerging Afghan Air Force is a “LAS competition.” However the fly off didn’t include dropping bombs or strafing because the AT-6 when going into the event wasn’t certified to drop bombs nor does it have an internal gun.

So if the AF Chief is talking about unnecessary risk – perhaps in this case physician heal thyself.

The practical matter is the names (LAA/LAS/LAAR) are interchangeable, when discussing the need for a piloted combat aircraft on the lower end of any airborne “hi-low” mix. A piloted attack aircraft is also at least for now generally considered tactically above unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The current reason why the piloted aircraft is above UAS in capability is ‘eyes on” capability real time.

A piloted attack aircraft is also at least for now generally considered tactically above unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The current reason why the piloted aircraft is above UAS in capability is ‘eyes on” capability real time.

An airborne pilot is up close and personal with both sensors and combat teeth and is not fighting the battle from a computer consulted half a world away. Although, to be fair, some controllers are also closer to the action but still must operate through a data link.

One caveat that must always be acknowledged is that all airborne technology is relative and constantly evolving against a reactive enemy — so UAS may get better and begin to be substituted for any “hi-lo” piloted solution. But not anytime soon as a stay-behind force for the Afghan AF. And there is still an open question yet to be determined about whether UAS technology will be more vulnerable to “cyber attacks”. Another fact, not often mentioned, is that the UAS accident rate is significantly higher than piloted aircraft.

As far as piloted light attack, well respected warrior commanders with troops in combat have been aggressively pursuing a light attack surveillance aircraft for the counter-insurgency role (COIN) in Afghanistan for quite some time. As General Mattis testified when he was head of Joint Forces Command)to the Senate [3]:

A Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can provide a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air support. This year Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project called Imminent Fury where the Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy.

Now General Mattis as Commander of Central Command is still concerned about bring a light attack aircraft to the fight. As mentioned, a “buy” of a squadron of LAS aircraft is in a current selection board for a stay behind combat force as the US and NATO allies draw down troop levels in our current fight against the Taliban.

This current source selection will hopefully be a full and fair selection process to avoid industry “risk” and thus really begin the significant transition to successfully put Afghanistan in the rear view mirror. The initial positioning of a light attack aircraft in Afghanistan – previously sabotaged by improper Congressional meddling because of domestic politics in the last Congress – now becomes critical in “end game Afghanistan.”

Consequently, with a new Congress and a fresh start and an AF Chief who doesn’t want industry “smoke being blown,” perhaps the war fighters will finally get what they need –a totally capable combat proven light attack aircraft both for US special ops and the Afghan AF.

Consequently, with a new Congress and a fresh start and an AF Chief who doesn’t want industry “smoke being blown,” perhaps the war fighters will finally get what they need –a totally capable combat proven light attack aircraft both for US special ops and the Afghan AF.

It is long past time for a pilot flying a light attack in Afghanistan to let the machine guns and cannons, and more AG ordinance say “guns guns guns” against the Taliban on the ground—“your dead!” http://www.sldinfo.com/guns-guns-guns/

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nick7777 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

A Nick Y a Zhue, A si y es que nos han vetado los A-29 , porque creen?... porque los gringos decidieron por nosotros que los drones están de moda pero la pregunta no es porque lo vetan si no porque nosotros queríamos comprarlo?, si solo por entrenadores, seguramente(Sarcasmo) y de paso como 36 aparatos muy bien o solo para darle matarile a algo como el Bronco y complementar a los T-27, sabiendo como lo pasan de rico a pesar del coñazo de drones que los gringos tienen en Afganistán, a pesar de que los ST ganaron una licitación en EEUU y tuvo que competir con él un viejo conocido, que los gringos se echaron para atrás es otra cosa... pero un avión contrainsurgencia y de control aéreo avanzado y COIN están más vigentes que nunca, es así, les guste o no...

Lamentablemente Nick vives en un país cuyas fuerzas armadas libraron una guerra de guerrillas y ganaron así sea por métodos non santos y sin ninguna gloria, pero ganaron, acuérdate que tanto el Bronco como un F-16 dan apoyo a las tropas de tierra, pero son ellas las que conquistan y ocupan el terreno, estos aviones y sus pilotos no ganan la guerra solitos al igual que todos, si los Colocos tienen 60 años peleando con sus A-29, Broncos, Fantamass y toda la parafernalia contrainsurgencia y tecnológica incluidos sus soldados universales y no están ni cerca de ganar, ese es su peo... la otra es... creen que el G-15 y sus pilotos en todos los años que tiene volando el Bronco con todas las tropas que Venezuela tiene en la frontera Colombiana juegan truco mientras se libra una guerra de guerrilla en un país vecino, si esto fuera así créanme ya la guerra hubiera traspasado las fronteras y se pelearía en pueblos del Táchira, Apure y el Zulia, pero no... ,

Los omnipresentes drones que operan en zonas donde no existe defensas antiaéreas, ni aviones que los cace, pero que tal que si… ¿Sabían qué? los Colocos en su periplo por Red Flag se ejercitaron para cazar drones y negar datos de inteligencia al potencial enemigo, obviamente pensando en nosotros ya que según er comandante tenemos la máquina de hacer churros montada, pues yo sé y ustedes saben que cazar drones con Kfeteras no es eficientes a menos que sea algo como un Global Hawk, pero ellos llevan la experiencia a casa para cazar drones con sus A-29 y Broncos, esto esta igualito para nosotros, pero si eliminan nuestros ojos en el aire, ¿Quién cree que va a ver lo que pasa en tierra? Pues por su puesto lo más barato dependiendo del tipo de aeronave y lo mejor es usar lo que nos ha funcionado siempre AVIONES Y PILOTOS EN EL AIRE y eso es un Bronquito, mirando, atacando y coordinando a otros aviones como el K-8 …

Chao….

¿Porqué nos vetaron?,¿aparte de el discurso del líder?,pues obviamente,para fastidiarnos y degradar todos nuestros sistemas de armas,te recuerdo dos cosas,para la época en que acá se planteó esa compra en la fuerza aérea,existía un real problema con el asunto de las guerrillas colombitches,y,además,la tecnología del uav y el ucav,no estaban tan desarrolladas.

La segunda cosa es que no estoy suponiendo"que tal si",un UAV nuestro lo caza un supertucano de ellos(la razón del supertucano en la FAC,es COIN,no te pongas a inventar bergas raras),si insistes en elucubrar,te dejo la misma:"que tal si",un k-8 nuestro revienta al bronco o supertucano?,te llamo a usar la lógica con esto:un UAV con una RCS mínima al radar enemigo,volando a 80km/h,¿llamaría la atención a la defensa aérea colombiana?,otra pregunta lógica:dado que nuestros uav son para reconocimiento dentro de nuestras fronteras:¿colombia enviará a un supertucano a nuestro espacio aéreo para buscar una vaina que parece un pájaro en el radar?,otra pregunta aún más lógica:¿como hace un radar tps-63 o 70 narcolombitch,para detectar unuav que vuele a 200-300 metros de altura?:por la curva de la tierra,y por la ubicación de tales radares,no lo detectaría.
Lo otro:los estados unidos pueden y deben mantener aeronaves COIN,nosotros no tenemos guerrillas en la selva,si no existe la necesidad,no nos sirve.

Y de verdad vale,con razón se arrechaba faust:se ponen a opinar de misiones cas y coin y ni siquiera goglean para ver de que vamos a opinar, la diferencia de una con otra ,ni los tipos de aeronaves que las ejecutaban,uno hace la tarea,les dá la explicación,les dice ,en base a la historia militar de los recientes y no recientes conflictos el porqué no se puede hacer lo mismo hoy,y no responden con un argumento;porque las cosas que detallé no son porque uno lo opine así o asao ,sinó que son las mismas razones que llevaron a los expertos de esos países a desarrollar una doctrina COIN diferente,pero señores,para saberlo,hay que leerlo,sinó tomamos en cuenta las diferencias y particularidades del contexto en que se desenvuelve una fuerza militar injerencista y el contexto nuestro,sinó conocemos y entendemos los conceptos vamos a pensar de verdad que se trata de los gustos de nick,cito:"aunque a nick y a zuhe no le guste",no se trata de gustos,se trata de ARGUMENTOS,y uno espera de gente que piensa bien como el estimado pajarraco,argumentos más sólidos para poder desechar los propios..porque amigo,eso que usted colocó,no lo puedo contrastar con nada de lo que escribí.saludos.

Yo no sé porque Faust se arrechaba y si se fue ese es su peo...
Yo no digo verga raras y pa que vean como los gringos si necesitaban todavía hasta no hace nada un avión COIN, esos aviones hacen falta? de bolas que sí, porque aquí si tenemos todas las condiciones para su uso y el que se quiera vendarse los ojos ese es su problema...
Una muestra…

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR)

In February 2012, the USAF announced that its FY13 budget proposal would end funding for both the Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) and the Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA) programs.

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program was to acquire an aircraft with modifications to satisfy the requirement for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance, and advanced aircraft training for irregular warfare operations in support of building partnership capacity for lesser developed partner nations. This program would provide a continental US-based capability to support irregular warfare efforts that help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating a light armed and reconnaissance capability that was consistent with their needs for supporting infrastructure, performance, anticipated methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and multi-role/multi-mission capability. LAAR was for training US pilots to train partner nation pilots, not for USAF combat employment.

The LAAR program grew out of the premise that countries in which the United States had a strategic interest were often in need of a platform that could provide conventional attack and limited reconnaissance capabilities, but were restricted economically from purchasing and maintaining conventional weapons systems in the US Air Force inventory. While such requirements for the nascent Iraqi Air Force subsequently disappeared, there was a need for such an aircraft in Afghanistan.

In addition, the USAF developed a requirement for a similar type of aircraft on which to train advisory personnel. The LAAR program was limited acquiring aircraft to provide an organic capability to train USAF advisory personnel for potential foreign security assistance missions. This would allow advisors to train on a type of aircraft similar that which would be common to foreign militaries, or supplied to them by the US. The LAAR aircraft were to have no combat role within the USAF.

In July 2009, the USAF issued a Capability Request for Information (CFRI) for an aircraft that would integrate with traditional command and control concepts and organizations and existing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Mission planning would require access to theater air tasking order and airspace control order dissemination networks. The Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft might be tasked as part of a joint team and would require communication capabilities to coordinate with supported and/or supporting units. LAAR platforms would employ a modular structure capable of interfacing with multiple weapons and sensors to tailor configuration to tasking and have robust, integrated sensors used to find, fix, track, and target within a single asset. For LAAR platforms, aerial gunnery and precision weapons would provide the ability to engage targets quickly, thus reducing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. LAAR platforms would also have the ability to coordinate fires directly with supported ground units through voice, video, and data links with other assets to create synergies and minimize fratricide.

The USAF's Aeronautical Systems Center issued the CFRI to determine the most cost-effective acquisition strategy to fulfill the need for 100 LAAR fixed-wing aircraft with deliveries starting in FY12 and an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY13. All proposed systems would be USAF Military certified and flown by military pilots. Existing Air Combat Command (ACC) facilities were to be used for aircraft storage and maintenance and USAF organic organizational-level maintenance would be established by the IOC date of FY13. Depot level maintenance was to be provided by the selected contractor.

In addition to the USAF requirement for the LAAR, it was also seen as having the potential for foreign sales as part of military assistance programs. The FY10 Foreign Military Financing spending plan for Lebanon, as submitted to Congress by the State Department, included $10 million for sustainment and repair of existing equipment, $14 million for acquisition of air, ground, and naval systems, $36 million for personal equipment, weapons, and ammunition and $40 million for close air support. The plan included the provision of LAAR aircraft that, according to the Defense Department, would provide the Lebanese Air Force with the capabilities to perform border security aerial surveillance and target acquisition. This military assistance component subsequently became the Light Air Support program (LAS).

After the formal establishment of the USAF LAS effort, it was expected that the LAAR program would leverage the LAS indefinite deliveries/indefinite quantities contract as a priced option if the technical requirements were validated to mirror the effort. Award follow-on task order for the LAAR aircraft was estimated to be December 2011 as of February 2011.

In the FY12 Defense Budget, the acquisition of the LAAR by the Secretary of the Air Force for Air Force inventory to be used in connection with training foreign military and other security forces was approved. However, the acquisition was limited so that, except as provided, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for FY12 could be obligated or expended for the procurement or fielding of the LAAR until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submitted to the congressional defense committees a report containing the findings of a review carried out by the Secretary of the capability of the elements of the Department of Defense that were responsible for conducting LAAR missions or fulfilling requests of partner nations for training in the conduct of such missions. The Secretary of Defense's report was to identify any gaps in the ability of the Department of Defense to conduct LAAR missions or to fulfill requests of partner nations for training in the conduct of such missions; identify any unnecessary duplication of efforts between the elements of the Department of Defense to procure or field aircraft to conduct LAAR missions or to fulfill requests of partner nations to train in the conduct of such missions, including any planned developmental efforts, operational evaluations, or acquisition of such aircraft through procurement or lease; and include findings and recommendations the Secretary of Defense considered appropriate to address any gaps or unnecessary duplication of efforts identified as part of the review. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/laar.htm

Otro Articulo

Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance
All the armed services have had to rethink and retool assets in light of asymmetrical conflicts, or irregular warfare (IW). For example, in the Navy, that has meant the increased use of Fast Boats and riverine attack craft. In the air, during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, air operations have seen the incalculable value of unmanned aerial vehicles that can now offer surveillance as well as strike capabilities.

The air force is currently looking at another asset that should prove valuable in IW situations that require more punch than a UAV, but are not appropriate for large manned fighters. These planes are designated as light attack armed reconnaissance (LAAR) and they are creating quite a buzz.

Recently the Air Force put out a capability request for information (CRFI) through its Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) based at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. The purpose of the CRFI was to explore the feasibility and possible purchase of 100 LAARs, with delivery to begin by 2012 and a full squadron in the air by 2013.

According to the CRFI, the USAF is “conducting a market research assessment of fixed wing platforms available for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance and advanced aircraft training in support of irregular warfare operations.” LAAR needs to be able to fill more than an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) role. They will need to be designed to acquire and fully engage targets as well.

The solicitation for feasibility calls for a two-seat turboprop that can fly as high as 30,000 feet, has full motion video cameras, and a data link that will interface with all existing ISR infrastructure. The airplane needs to be able to conduct precision aerial gunnery and combat maneuvers, and be equipped with two 500 pound bombs, 2.75-inch rockets and rail-launched munitions in addition to its guns. The LAAR also must possess an infrared suppressor and other countermeasures such as a radar-warning receiver, and the cockpit must be armored. The plane should also be equipped with zero-altitude/zero-airspeed ejection seats as well.

Among the front runners expected to meet these requirements are the Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, the Air Tractor AT-802U, Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano, and the Pilatus PC-9 Trainer.

“The Super Tucano complies with most of the LAAR requirements, since it was developed from the ground to perform both training and light attack/COIN, close air support, border surveillance and armed ISR missions, as well as training missions and has been performing those missions very successfully,” said Acir Luiz de Almeida Padilha Jr., vice president marketing and sales, defense market. “Nevertheless, each client requires some specific customizations, which the Super Tucano can meet because of the flexible avionics architecture and the power, cooling and space available for new systems integration. This growth capacity and flexibility also allows us to integrate new weapons according to specific customer requirements.”

“We can say that our advantage over the competition is that we already have a battle proven product, with demonstrated capabilities flying in five different air forces. We have what the ground forces needs available now,” Padilha continued.

“The Super Tucano is the only operational aircraft that was developed from the ground for this mission,” said Padilha. “It has the highest weapons load in its class—3,400 pounds—and already has more than 40 external load configurations cleared, including dumb and intelligent weapons, 70 mm rockets, cluster bombs and air-to-air missiles. Another important feature is the EO/ IR sensors integrated with the weapons systems, with laser designation capacity. And above all, it’s has been proved in combat.”

The AT-802U is designed to provide inexpensive and prolonged ISR, logistic resupply, and force application capability to ground force commanders. It is based on the armored version of Air Tractor’s 16,000 pound gross weight AT-802 agricultural aircraft that has been supplied to the U.S. Department of State for narcotic crop eradication in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

“This armored AT-802 serves as a great starting point for the LAAR platform, said Lee Jackson, Air Tractor design engineer. “It is a two seat, dual control aircraft that can serve in a tactical training role as well as an operational role.”

According to the company, the AT-802U is combat ready with a fully integrated MX-15Di sensor turret that is capable of laser target designation, compact multiband data link that can stream real-time imagery and metadata, and an operational dual GAU-19/A .50 caliber gun system with over 2,700 rounds of ammunition. The aircraft has six wing hard points rated at over 600 pounds each and three centerline hard points rated at 1,000 pounds each. With an additional fuel tank, the aircraft has about ten hours of endurance. “We are so excited about the great interest that our aircraft has drawn from not only the special operations community but from partnering nations to the U.S. who are seeking a robust, inexpensive, and capable aircraft to protect and support their national interests,” said Jackson.

The HBC AT-6B is being developed as a joint venture with Lockheed Martin specifically to enter the LAAR competition. In a company press release, Hawker Beechcraft Chairman and CEO Bill Boisture said, “This teaming agreement marks a big step forward in working to meet the Air Force’s emerging irregular warfare needs. By teaming with Lockheed Martin, we will deliver an AT-6 LAAR aircraft that meets the training and light attack capabilities the Air Force needs in one flexible platform. The AT-6 is a low-risk, low-cost solution that complements existing combat aircraft capabilities and will contribute to the Air Force’s building partner capacity initiatives around the world.”

“The Hawker Beechcraft and Lockheed Martin team bring together the best of both worlds: a proven platform and a proven mission system integration capability,” added Marillyn Hewson, president of Lockheed Martin Systems Integration.

Light attack aircraft have the advantage of being able to launch from austere forward positions, and will not require fully paved runways for takeoff or landing. They will be able to remain aloft for several hours, and being armored and equipped with various sophisticated countermeasures, LAARs will be able to survive most threats from ground fire. They can also be specially outfitted for operations in mountainous terrains—all in all, a profile that should make the LAAR fleet, once it is established, particularly appealing to the special ops community.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG INTERDICTION

Much like their nautical counterparts’ riverine combat craft and fast boats, light attack aircraft have already proven themselves in law enforcement or drug interdiction operations.

Operating as a division of the U.S. State Department, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ Office of Aviation (INL/A) is charged with the mission of cutting off the supply of illicit drugs from foreign sources to the U.S.

Air operations by the bureau include aerial eradication of poppy fields and other drug crops, interdiction of refining laboratories and smuggling activities, and other law enforcement operations. The bureau operates some 340 fixed wing and rotary wing assets, including several that would be designated as light attack aircraft, that have flown successful counternarcotics missions in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Assets flown by INL/A include Air Tractor’s AT-802, armed and armored crop duster, and they have flown missions in conjunction with Embraer’s Super Tucanos flown by Brazilian and Columbian pilots.

ECONOMIES OF “SCALE”

It is not only tactics that are driving the need for light attack craft. The USAF is interested in combating the threats posed by insurgency and IW, with a solution that can be more cost-effective than a fully equipped jet fighter or a complex UAV system.

DoD has shown increased interest in purchasing these kinds of light attack aircraft, such as the armed crop dusters proved effective in the war on drugs, as commercial off-the-shelf deliverables requiring little or no modification for military operations.

According to Charles Vanderberg, acquisition program manager, light attack aircraft with ASC, “If the USAF decides to pursue an acquisition program, then a materiel development decision (MDD) would determine where in the DoD acquisition process the program would enter, either the engineering and manufacturing development phase if systems development is needed, or the production and deployment phase if a non-development item is suitable for the needed capability. If a MDD for LAAR occurs by September 2010, we would plan for earliest possible delivery by late FY13 or early FY14.”

Besides the current CRFI put out by ASC, the U.S. Navy is already evaluating an up-armed version of the Super Tucano under a classified testing program known as ‘Imminent Fury.’ Imminent Fury is currently testing a single aircraft, but the Navy is seeking a budget of $44 million to expand the program. The Special Operations Command, Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps are also interested in employing off-the-shelf air assets for lowintensity ISR with fast strike capability, and have expressed interest in the Armed Super Tucanos currently operated by Brazil, Columbia and the Dominican Republic.

The Air National Guard has also announced that it will enter into an evaluation of the Beechcraft AT-6 Texan II later this year. The USAF, while not committing to the purchase of a LAAR fleet yet, is ordering dozens of AT-6s on behalf of the rebuilding Iraqi air force.

EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN

In many ways, light attack aircraft are a modern day throwback to the powerful turbo prop fighters of yesteryear. Boeing recently confirmed that it is seriously considering reviving the Vietnam- era OV-10 Bronco program as a possible entry into the LAAR CRFI mix. Currently designated OV-10-X, the twinengine plane would maintain much of its 1960s-vintage rugged exterior, but the 21st century version will feature a computerized glass cockpit, ISR sensor arrays and smart bomb-dropping capabilities.

Chuck Burin, one of the founders and the current chairman of the board of the OV-10 Bronco Association (OBA) and who flew the venerable aircraft in Vietnam, thinks revamping the program would be a great idea. “The OV-10 is an aircraft that is ideal for what they need in a low-threat environment,” said Burin. “It is a proven concept.”

In fact, several years ago Burin said that a congressional representative who was trying to find out the status of available old OV-10’s approached him. His answer was—unfortunately—“ not so many.” While the Bronco is a proven platform that could fulfill the LAAR requirements, there are not enough existing airframes to upgrade. So if Boeing pursues this avenue, they will have to rebuild new aircraft. Said Burin, “You’re going to have to build a totally new aircraft, because there are just no old ones available. As far as I know the original tooling is still available—the wings will have to be beefed up to carry more weaponry, as will the engines, but I see no major problems getting the Bronco to meet the mission specs for LAAR.”

Several foreign militaries are still flying the Bronco, and incidentally, INL/A operates original OV-10 Broncos as part of their drug interdiction wing.

The light attack/armed reconnaissance fleet, if finally approved, would join a growing COIN air force within an air force. The USAF has already purchased 37 Hawker Beechcraft MC-12Ws to serve as manned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, filling a role previously served almost exclusively by UAVs—attesting to what special forces have always known: that when it comes to irregular warfare, the man is as important as the machine. http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-home/233-sotech-2010-volume-8-issue-2-march/2669-light-attack-armed-reconnaissance.html

Para el que no lo sepa o Ignore los aviones participante en este programa fueron A-29, OV-10X,AT-6B, A-67, Air Tractor AT-802U, Alenia Aermacchi M-346, resultando ganador el A-29 si los gringos se echaron para atrás es otra vaina, después estos aviones a según se iban para las fuerzas armadas de Afganistán y ya ni eso, pero originalmente les cuidarían el culo a los gringos ¿saben por qué ellos sacan este programa?, pues muy sencillo no les resulta rentable ni barato tener ni AH-64 y F-15 y F-16 en el teatro de operaciones y los mochos drones causan demasiados daños colaterales incluso a sus aliados, pero qué coño se retiran de forma gradual de Afganistán y ya la sinverguesura de los drones es tolerada porque el complejo militar indutrial impone su compra...
Para que vean lo malos que es tener un controlador aereo avanzados en el siglo 21

The LAAR Lightweight Combat Aircraft Is Coming to the Air Force
A small, nimble warplane – an economical featherweight compared to robust combat aircraft like the 40-ton F-15E Strike Eagle – now enjoys a high priority on the Air Force’s shopping list as the service remakes itself for counter-insurgency conflicts.

Under the OA-X program begun in September 2008, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz is pushing toward an eventual, $2 billion purchase of up to 100 Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft. The LAAR is likely to be a turboprop aircraft and will be part of mainstream Air Force operations. Air Combat Command (ACC) is performing developmental work rather than, as might be expected in an unorthodox effort, Air Force Special Operations Command.

One observer, given a glimpse of ACC’s capabilities-based assessment conducted in 2009, made the comment that, “this looks a lot like World War II.” That was a reference to the likely airframe and the guns and bombs it will carry, not to the 21st century digital avionics ACC expects to pack inside. An ACC official responded: “Yeah. We get that a lot.”

Among aircraft being proposed are the AirTractor AT802U (a modified crop duster, demonstrated at the 2009 Paris Air Show), Alenia M346, Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, and Pilatus PC-6 Porter. Pentagon officials say LAAR must be derived from an “in production” aircraft design. Boeing, however, is proposing an OV-10(X) Bronco, based on the twin-engine, twin-boom forward air control aircraft of the Vietnam era, which the planemaker would return to production at a facility not yet chosen.

The Air Force wants a “kinetic,” or rapid engagement, capability that, it says, “will reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline cycle.” The LAAR aircraft will also function as a digital-era forward air controller, coordinating fire directly with supported ground units through voice, video and datalinks – and minimizing the danger of blue-on-blue or “friendly fire” incidents.

One reason for LAAR and the OA-X program: operating cost. The Air Force wants an aircraft that can fly one combat hour for $1,000. A combat flight hour costs $7,750 for an F-16C Fighting Falcon and fully $44,000 for an F-15E Strike Eagle.

Typical air-to-ground ordnance for LAAR will include one or two podded 7.62-mm. mini-guns, two 500-pound guided-munitions, 2.75-inch rocket projectiles and the AGM-114N Hellfire air-to-ground missile. A “needs” document that does not yet have formal status calls for operating from austere airfields on five-hour missions over distances of 900 nautical miles up to a ceiling of 30,000 feet.

In its short-term plans for the new aircraft, the Air Force plans to purchase 15 examples in fiscal year 2011. ACC wants a 24-aircraft squadron ready for combat within two years and will then decide whether to equip an entire wing. If the program grows as expected, many of the aircraft will be assigned to Air National Guard units.

Last November, Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan) and Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stating concerns with reports that the United States and Brazil are negotiating for acquisition of Super Tucanos. Brownback and Tiahrt, strong defenders of the Wichita-built AT-6B, argued that such an agreement would “demean the integrity of the federal acquisition process” and cost thousands of American jobs.

Closely related to the OA-X program and the LAAR aircraft, the Navy is November 2009 launched Imminent Fury, a demonstrator program with a leased Super Tucano, designated A-29B in Pentagon parlance. The purpose: special operations support for SEAL teams in the field. The Imminent Fury aircraft is equipped with an electro-optical sensor in a nose turret and satellite and secure communications systems. According to one source, the Navy leased the Super Tucano from EP Aviation, a subsidiary of the contractor Xe Security, formerly Blackwater International.
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-laar-lightweight-combat-aircraft-is-coming-to-the-air-force/

Lo siento pero en Venezuela no había una simple la intención de Compra del A-29, por el caprichito de oficiales que después se fueron a Altamira, fue mucho más allá y ustedes los saben, no pretendan cambiar la historia, el veto retrasó que jode muchas cosas sobre todo en el escalón de entrenamiento y ataque ligero tanto que todavía er comandante les saca esos trapitos a los brasileros y gringo cada vez que puede y el K-8 fue adquirido casi como premio de consolación, todavía me acuerdo de algunos calificativos de algunos Aquí "el K-8 es como un Tucano de lento pero sin la Hélice" y así un bojote de vainas, menos mal que al final el avión resulto, pero todavi así el K-8 no es que se adapta a los resitos al menos de los gringos y que el A-29 cumplia, pero a falta de pan buenas son tortas, tanto que el A-29 puede tener armas guiadas y atacar por encima de las defensas enemigas y toda la paja no se crean ese cuento chino de que el K-8 era en un principio maná caido del cielo, ese avion se ha tenido que ganar a pulso su reputacion, por eso a pesar de todo el primer pedido no fue echo para los números que muchos esperavamos se hablo en principio de 24, para llegar a solo 18, K-8; cuando el A-29 tenia asegurado 36 aparatos, pero no es culpa del K-8 sino que el A-29 fue llevado diseñado para cumplir muchas misones para lo cual el K-8 debe adaptarse en el camino y ahora si dios quiere es que vamos por el segundo lote de K-8 ...

coño este articulo esta mas interesnte...

“Guns Guns Guns”
The continuing saga of the US and light attack aircraft
By Ed Timperlake


03/02/2011- In a practice air-to-air engagement, when one fighter closed on his opponent inside of the missile envelope to put the gun sight piper on the adversary, a call goes out “guns guns guns.” This is a blunt fighter pilot way of saying “your dead!” In real life, the aircraft’s machine guns or cannons will do the actual “speaking”, as the above video from a shoot down in South America shows. This video shows the aggressive and very successful use of a Tucano, which now is in consideration for use in combat in Afghanistan.

In a practice air-to-air engagement, when one fighter closed on his opponent inside of the missile envelope to put the gun sight piper on the adversary, a call goes out “guns guns guns.” This is a blunt fighter pilot way of saying “your dead!” In real life, the aircraft’s machine guns or cannons will do the actual “speaking”…

There is currently a competition to provide for a Light Combat Aircraft for the Afghan forces being trained by the USAF. But is interesting to ask why does the USAF need a competition in any case, given that there is only one battle tested competitor flying today. General Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has recently and forcefully stressed that industry should not be blowing smoke by laying off risk with over promising and sliding on delivery [1]. With that forceful philosophy it is amazing that the Super Tucano a proven aircraft isn’t already in Afghanistan. The shoot down is a demonstration of versatility of the air-to-air capability of the Tucano, now upgraded to Super Tucano. For Afghanistan, the truly important combat reality is the fact that the Colombian Air Force is having noteworthy success in the air-to-ground attack mode (AG) [2].

An LAA/LAS/LAAR For “End-Game Afghanistan” ?
Before any further discussion of roles and missions for an Afghanistan “light attack” aircraft can proceed, various definitions of what is being discussed must be clarified. The two planes in competition, a piloted turbo-prop like the AT-6 “Texan” and A-29 Super Tucano have been called a Light Attack Aircraft (LAA), a Light Attack Surveillance (LAS) aircraft and a Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft. These distinctions only become important when discussing the names given by DOD for awarding various technology contracts.

For example, a recent fly off between the Hawker Beech AT-6 and Embraer Super Tucano to select the appropriate combat aircraft for the emerging Afghan Air Force is a “LAS competition.” However the fly off didn’t include dropping bombs or strafing because the AT-6 when going into the event wasn’t certified to drop bombs nor does it have an internal gun.

So if the AF Chief is talking about unnecessary risk – perhaps in this case physician heal thyself.

The practical matter is the names (LAA/LAS/LAAR) are interchangeable, when discussing the need for a piloted combat aircraft on the lower end of any airborne “hi-low” mix. A piloted attack aircraft is also at least for now generally considered tactically above unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The current reason why the piloted aircraft is above UAS in capability is ‘eyes on” capability real time.

A piloted attack aircraft is also at least for now generally considered tactically above unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The current reason why the piloted aircraft is above UAS in capability is ‘eyes on” capability real time.

An airborne pilot is up close and personal with both sensors and combat teeth and is not fighting the battle from a computer consulted half a world away. Although, to be fair, some controllers are also closer to the action but still must operate through a data link.

One caveat that must always be acknowledged is that all airborne technology is relative and constantly evolving against a reactive enemy — so UAS may get better and begin to be substituted for any “hi-lo” piloted solution. But not anytime soon as a stay-behind force for the Afghan AF. And there is still an open question yet to be determined about whether UAS technology will be more vulnerable to “cyber attacks”. Another fact, not often mentioned, is that the UAS accident rate is significantly higher than piloted aircraft.

As far as piloted light attack, well respected warrior commanders with troops in combat have been aggressively pursuing a light attack surveillance aircraft for the counter-insurgency role (COIN) in Afghanistan for quite some time. As General Mattis testified when he was head of Joint Forces Command)to the Senate [3]:

A Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can provide a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air support. This year Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project called Imminent Fury where the Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy.

Now General Mattis as Commander of Central Command is still concerned about bring a light attack aircraft to the fight. As mentioned, a “buy” of a squadron of LAS aircraft is in a current selection board for a stay behind combat force as the US and NATO allies draw down troop levels in our current fight against the Taliban.

This current source selection will hopefully be a full and fair selection process to avoid industry “risk” and thus really begin the significant transition to successfully put Afghanistan in the rear view mirror. The initial positioning of a light attack aircraft in Afghanistan – previously sabotaged by improper Congressional meddling because of domestic politics in the last Congress – now becomes critical in “end game Afghanistan.”

Consequently, with a new Congress and a fresh start and an AF Chief who doesn’t want industry “smoke being blown,” perhaps the war fighters will finally get what they need –a totally capable combat proven light attack aircraft both for US special ops and the Afghan AF.

Consequently, with a new Congress and a fresh start and an AF Chief who doesn’t want industry “smoke being blown,” perhaps the war fighters will finally get what they need –a totally capable combat proven light attack aircraft both for US special ops and the Afghan AF.

It is long past time for a pilot flying a light attack in Afghanistan to let the machine guns and cannons, and more AG ordinance say “guns guns guns” against the Taliban on the ground—“your dead!” http://www.sldinfo.com/guns-guns-guns/

Y así puedo seguir todo el día, la vaina de vetar la compra por los gringos del A-29 si efectivamente es para joder, pero para fastidiarnos de manera muy bien pensada y justificada para ellos al negarnos un medio aéreo prácticamente insustituibles .... Me joden el entrenamiento de pilotos y me quitan de la boca el mejor avión y de mas bajos costos de operación para las misiones mas demandantes en las fronteras, y de paso me niegan los repuestos para el reto de los aviones como el T-27 y el Bronco que cumplen con muchas de esas misiones en la frontera, pues si esos bichos no hacen falta que ¡viva la pepa, carajo! ....