Entrenadores

Arpia escribió:

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR)

In February 2012, the USAF announced that its FY13 budget proposal would end funding for both the Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) and the Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA) programs.

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program was to acquire an aircraft with modifications to satisfy the requirement for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance, and advanced aircraft training for irregular warfare operations in support of building partnership capacity for lesser developed partner nations. This program would provide a continental US-based capability to support irregular warfare efforts that help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating a light armed and reconnaissance capability that was consistent with their needs for supporting infrastructure, performance, anticipated methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and multi-role/multi-mission capability. LAAR was for training US pilots to train partner nation pilots, not for USAF combat employment.

Aviones de Ataque
ligero de reconocimiento Armado( Apoyo Aéreo Ligero) / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) El programa era adquirir una aeronave
con modificaciones para satisfacer el requisito de la realización de ataque, reconocimiento armado, y aviones de entrenamiento avanzado para
operaciones de guerra irregular en apoyo de la construcción de una socieda para dar
capacidad a países socios inferiores pocos desarrollados.
Este programa proporciona una capacidad con sede continental para
apoyar los esfuerzos de guerra irregular y ayuden a prepararlos para defender a sus gobiernos ellos mismos, mediante la
demostración de un avion con capacidad de reconocimiento armado que este
en consonancia con sus necesidades de infraestructura de apoyo,
rendimiento,métodos previstos de empleo, costos de adquisición y
logística, con la capacidad multi-role/multi-mission.
LAAR era para entrenamiento pilotos norteamericanos para entrenar a los
pilotos de las naciones aliadas, no para el empleo combate USAF.

....

delta074 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR)

In February 2012, the USAF announced that its FY13 budget proposal would end funding for both the Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) and the Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA) programs.

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program was to acquire an aircraft with modifications to satisfy the requirement for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance, and advanced aircraft training for irregular warfare operations in support of building partnership capacity for lesser developed partner nations. This program would provide a continental US-based capability to support irregular warfare efforts that help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating a light armed and reconnaissance capability that was consistent with their needs for supporting infrastructure, performance, anticipated methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and multi-role/multi-mission capability. LAAR was for training US pilots to train partner nation pilots, not for USAF combat employment.

Aviones de Ataque
ligero de reconocimiento Armado( Apoyo Aéreo Ligero) / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) El programa era adquirir una aeronave
con modificaciones para satisfacer el requisito de la realización de ataque, reconocimiento armado, y aviones de entrenamiento avanzado para
operaciones de guerra irregular en apoyo de la construcción de una socieda para dar
capacidad a países socios inferiores pocos desarrollados.
Este programa proporciona una capacidad con sede continental para
apoyar los esfuerzos de guerra irregular y ayuden a prepararlos para defender a sus gobiernos ellos mismos, mediante la
demostración de un avion con capacidad de reconocimiento armado que este
en consonancia con sus necesidades de infraestructura de apoyo,
rendimiento,métodos previstos de empleo, costos de adquisición y
logística, con la capacidad multi-role/multi-mission.
LAAR era para entrenamiento pilotos norteamericanos para entrenar a los
pilotos de las naciones aliadas, no para el empleo combate USAF.

....

Para no sufrir de indigestion y saborear el bocado, decifremos este pararafo.
Si te entiendo; el termino de avion de ataque ligero o entrenador ligero fue diseñado por los americanos para que nosotros mismo
¿cuidaramos sus intereses en cada pais donde ellos tengan intereses?
Entonces al retirarnos los recursos para la compra de los Supertucanos, se aseguraban que estos no defenderian al gobierno de alguna presunta guerrilla que pudiera formarse.
Bueno, no estaba tan perdido cuando escribi algo parecido de que su objetivo fue eliminar el primer escalon de vuelo para formar Pilotos.

¿Que tal?
¿quien se atreve a analizar el proximo parrafo?

programa LAAR surgió de la premisa de que los países en los que los
Estados Unidos tenían un interés estratégico que menudo tenian la necesidad de
una plataforma que podría proporcionar ataque convencional y reducida
capacidad de reconocimiento, sino que se limitaron económicamente a la
adquisición y mantenimiento de sistemas de armas convencionales para los
EE.UU.e inventario de la Fuerza Aérea.
Mientras que tales requisitos para la Fuerza Aérea Iraquí naciente
posteriormente desaparecida,se habría una necesidad en este tipo de aviones y
en Afganistán.
Destruyeron su Fuerza Aerea para darle una protectora de gobiernos


Además, la USAF desarrollo un requisito para un tipo similar de
aeronave para entrenar al personal de asesoramiento.
El programa LAAR se limitó a la adquisición de aeronaves para
proporcionar una capacidad orgánica para entrenar personal de la USAF de
asesoramiento para posibles misiones extranjeras de asistencia de
seguridad.
Esto permitiría a los asesores entrenar en un tipo de aeronave
similar que la que sería común a militares extranjeros o que les sea
suministrada por los EE.UU.. El avión LAAR no iban a tener ningún papel en el combate de la USAF.
De manera que...
¿para que nos sirven?
Insisto; solo para entrenar y agarrar habilidades y experiencia de vuelo
para pasar a un avion mas avanzado que si proteja al Pais

Acero Joan escribió:cual es la importancia de tener aviones entrenadores de helice?

Acero Joan escribió:eso es lo principal que es mas facil de mantener y muy barato, pero yo tambien soy partidario del uso de uavs, de hecho antes que todos opinaran temprano iba a escribir que porque no usar uavs para ese tipo de misiones y asi no se sacrifican pilotos sin necesidad, me cohibi de hacerlo porque no tengo mucha informacion del tema pero en el momento fue lo que mas logico me parecio.

Acero Joan escribió:el tema se ah modificado totalmente yo cuando entre me parecio raro que hablaran de ese tipo de misiones para entrenadores, y no es que no hayan sido efectivos en su momento, pero olvidan que en vietnam los sa 7 eran muy sensibles, la nueva generacion de manpads hace que usar esos aviones sea desperdicio, ah mi parecer cuando los colombianos vuelan con la moral alta misiones de combate, es porque saben que las farc no poseen esos medios en grandes cantidades, y si es que los llegan a tener, en zonas como Afganistan y Libia, hubiese sido suicidio usarlos, nada mas en Libia la gente anda sacandose fotos con los manpads y el caso afgano ya todos los conocemos....

El uav no es que sea lo mejor de lo mejor, pero es mas barato y no desperdicias personal, y un grupo rebelde no creo que tenga la capacidad de hackearlo tan facilmente, a menos que otros tengan las manos metidas en el asunto.

Otra cosa es que si te derriban un entrenador lo primero que van a decir es que fue un su o cualquier vaina por el estilo, y como se le sube la moral al enemigo cuando derriban un aeronave

Chaco escribió:Aquí tienen todos los entrenadores que se producen en el mercado:

http://www.taringa.net/posts/imagenes/14250507/_Megapost_Aviones-militares-_entrenadores-avansados-ataque_.html

Acero Joan escribió:si se usaron nick entre 1972 y 1975 de hecho hay un caso particular donde un f 5 fue alcanzado pero logro llegar a la base. Los sa 7 se despacharon bastantes helicopteros gringos

Acero Joan escribió:ok compa

duway666 escribió:Bueno mientras los amigos aquí en el foro terminan de escoger el entrenador básico, ..estas son las primeras alas que se colocan nuestros pichones..

el ministro de Defensa, Arturo Puricelli, acompañado de los diferentes organismos que componen el Sistema de Producción para la Defensa Nacional, recorrió la Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA), con asiento en la provincia de Córdoba, donde se suscribió un convenio de producción tecnológica, entre la fábrica de aviones, la empresa estatal INVAP, de alta tecnología, y el Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial (INTI). Si bien no trascendieron los detalles del acuerdo, se supo que el mismo se encuentra relacionado con la producción enteramente nacional de aviónica y radares para los prototipos del avión IA-63 Pampa II que la fábrica está construyendo; para el proyecto del nuevo avión de entrenamiento básico para la Fuerza Aérea Argentina (FAA) IA-73 y para los trabajos de modernización de los IA-58 Pucará.

zuhe escribió:

Chaco escribió:Aquí tienen todos los entrenadores que se producen en el mercado:

http://www.taringa.net/posts/imagenes/14250507/_Megapost_Aviones-militares-_entrenadores-avansados-ataque_.html

Ojo el Mako de diseño alemán no se produce en serie, de hecho ese proyecto creo que esta parado.

nick7777 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

nick7777 escribió:

¿Porqué nos vetaron?,¿aparte de el discurso del líder?,pues obviamente,para fastidiarnos y degradar todos nuestros sistemas de armas,te recuerdo dos cosas,para la época en que acá se planteó esa compra en la fuerza aérea,existía un real problema con el asunto de las guerrillas colombitches,y,además,la tecnología del uav y el ucav,no estaban tan desarrolladas.

La segunda cosa es que no estoy suponiendo"que tal si",un UAV nuestro lo caza un supertucano de ellos(la razón del supertucano en la FAC,es COIN,no te pongas a inventar bergas raras),si insistes en elucubrar,te dejo la misma:"que tal si",un k-8 nuestro revienta al bronco o supertucano?,te llamo a usar la lógica con esto:un UAV con una RCS mínima al radar enemigo,volando a 80km/h,¿llamaría la atención a la defensa aérea colombiana?,otra pregunta lógica:dado que nuestros uav son para reconocimiento dentro de nuestras fronteras:¿colombia enviará a un supertucano a nuestro espacio aéreo para buscar una vaina que parece un pájaro en el radar?,otra pregunta aún más lógica:¿como hace un radar tps-63 o 70 narcolombitch,para detectar unuav que vuele a 200-300 metros de altura?:por la curva de la tierra,y por la ubicación de tales radares,no lo detectaría.
Lo otro:los estados unidos pueden y deben mantener aeronaves COIN,nosotros no tenemos guerrillas en la selva,si no existe la necesidad,no nos sirve.

Y de verdad vale,con razón se arrechaba faust:se ponen a opinar de misiones cas y coin y ni siquiera goglean para ver de que vamos a opinar, la diferencia de una con otra ,ni los tipos de aeronaves que las ejecutaban,uno hace la tarea,les dá la explicación,les dice ,en base a la historia militar de los recientes y no recientes conflictos el porqué no se puede hacer lo mismo hoy,y no responden con un argumento;porque las cosas que detallé no son porque uno lo opine así o asao ,sinó que son las mismas razones que llevaron a los expertos de esos países a desarrollar una doctrina COIN diferente,pero señores,para saberlo,hay que leerlo,sinó tomamos en cuenta las diferencias y particularidades del contexto en que se desenvuelve una fuerza militar injerencista y el contexto nuestro,sinó conocemos y entendemos los conceptos vamos a pensar de verdad que se trata de los gustos de nick,cito:"aunque a nick y a zuhe no le guste",no se trata de gustos,se trata de ARGUMENTOS,y uno espera de gente que piensa bien como el estimado pajarraco,argumentos más sólidos para poder desechar los propios..porque amigo,eso que usted colocó,no lo puedo contrastar con nada de lo que escribí.saludos.

Yo no sé porque Faust se arrechaba y si se fue ese es su peo...
Yo no digo verga raras y pa que vean como los gringos si necesitaban todavía hasta no hace nada un avión COIN, esos aviones hacen falta? de bolas que sí, porque aquí si tenemos todas las condiciones para su uso y el que se quiera vendarse los ojos ese es su problema...
Una muestra…

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR)

In February 2012, the USAF announced that its FY13 budget proposal would end funding for both the Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) and the Light Mobility Aircraft (LIMA) programs.

Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program was to acquire an aircraft with modifications to satisfy the requirement for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance, and advanced aircraft training for irregular warfare operations in support of building partnership capacity for lesser developed partner nations. This program would provide a continental US-based capability to support irregular warfare efforts that help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating a light armed and reconnaissance capability that was consistent with their needs for supporting infrastructure, performance, anticipated methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and multi-role/multi-mission capability. LAAR was for training US pilots to train partner nation pilots, not for USAF combat employment.

The LAAR program grew out of the premise that countries in which the United States had a strategic interest were often in need of a platform that could provide conventional attack and limited reconnaissance capabilities, but were restricted economically from purchasing and maintaining conventional weapons systems in the US Air Force inventory. While such requirements for the nascent Iraqi Air Force subsequently disappeared, there was a need for such an aircraft in Afghanistan.

In addition, the USAF developed a requirement for a similar type of aircraft on which to train advisory personnel. The LAAR program was limited acquiring aircraft to provide an organic capability to train USAF advisory personnel for potential foreign security assistance missions. This would allow advisors to train on a type of aircraft similar that which would be common to foreign militaries, or supplied to them by the US. The LAAR aircraft were to have no combat role within the USAF.

In July 2009, the USAF issued a Capability Request for Information (CFRI) for an aircraft that would integrate with traditional command and control concepts and organizations and existing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Mission planning would require access to theater air tasking order and airspace control order dissemination networks. The Light Attack / Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft might be tasked as part of a joint team and would require communication capabilities to coordinate with supported and/or supporting units. LAAR platforms would employ a modular structure capable of interfacing with multiple weapons and sensors to tailor configuration to tasking and have robust, integrated sensors used to find, fix, track, and target within a single asset. For LAAR platforms, aerial gunnery and precision weapons would provide the ability to engage targets quickly, thus reducing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. LAAR platforms would also have the ability to coordinate fires directly with supported ground units through voice, video, and data links with other assets to create synergies and minimize fratricide.

The USAF's Aeronautical Systems Center issued the CFRI to determine the most cost-effective acquisition strategy to fulfill the need for 100 LAAR fixed-wing aircraft with deliveries starting in FY12 and an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY13. All proposed systems would be USAF Military certified and flown by military pilots. Existing Air Combat Command (ACC) facilities were to be used for aircraft storage and maintenance and USAF organic organizational-level maintenance would be established by the IOC date of FY13. Depot level maintenance was to be provided by the selected contractor.

In addition to the USAF requirement for the LAAR, it was also seen as having the potential for foreign sales as part of military assistance programs. The FY10 Foreign Military Financing spending plan for Lebanon, as submitted to Congress by the State Department, included $10 million for sustainment and repair of existing equipment, $14 million for acquisition of air, ground, and naval systems, $36 million for personal equipment, weapons, and ammunition and $40 million for close air support. The plan included the provision of LAAR aircraft that, according to the Defense Department, would provide the Lebanese Air Force with the capabilities to perform border security aerial surveillance and target acquisition. This military assistance component subsequently became the Light Air Support program (LAS).

After the formal establishment of the USAF LAS effort, it was expected that the LAAR program would leverage the LAS indefinite deliveries/indefinite quantities contract as a priced option if the technical requirements were validated to mirror the effort. Award follow-on task order for the LAAR aircraft was estimated to be December 2011 as of February 2011.

In the FY12 Defense Budget, the acquisition of the LAAR by the Secretary of the Air Force for Air Force inventory to be used in connection with training foreign military and other security forces was approved. However, the acquisition was limited so that, except as provided, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for FY12 could be obligated or expended for the procurement or fielding of the LAAR until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submitted to the congressional defense committees a report containing the findings of a review carried out by the Secretary of the capability of the elements of the Department of Defense that were responsible for conducting LAAR missions or fulfilling requests of partner nations for training in the conduct of such missions. The Secretary of Defense's report was to identify any gaps in the ability of the Department of Defense to conduct LAAR missions or to fulfill requests of partner nations for training in the conduct of such missions; identify any unnecessary duplication of efforts between the elements of the Department of Defense to procure or field aircraft to conduct LAAR missions or to fulfill requests of partner nations to train in the conduct of such missions, including any planned developmental efforts, operational evaluations, or acquisition of such aircraft through procurement or lease; and include findings and recommendations the Secretary of Defense considered appropriate to address any gaps or unnecessary duplication of efforts identified as part of the review. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/laar.htm

Otro Articulo

Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance
All the armed services have had to rethink and retool assets in light of asymmetrical conflicts, or irregular warfare (IW). For example, in the Navy, that has meant the increased use of Fast Boats and riverine attack craft. In the air, during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, air operations have seen the incalculable value of unmanned aerial vehicles that can now offer surveillance as well as strike capabilities.

The air force is currently looking at another asset that should prove valuable in IW situations that require more punch than a UAV, but are not appropriate for large manned fighters. These planes are designated as light attack armed reconnaissance (LAAR) and they are creating quite a buzz.

Recently the Air Force put out a capability request for information (CRFI) through its Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) based at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. The purpose of the CRFI was to explore the feasibility and possible purchase of 100 LAARs, with delivery to begin by 2012 and a full squadron in the air by 2013.

According to the CRFI, the USAF is “conducting a market research assessment of fixed wing platforms available for conducting strike, armed reconnaissance and advanced aircraft training in support of irregular warfare operations.” LAAR needs to be able to fill more than an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) role. They will need to be designed to acquire and fully engage targets as well.

The solicitation for feasibility calls for a two-seat turboprop that can fly as high as 30,000 feet, has full motion video cameras, and a data link that will interface with all existing ISR infrastructure. The airplane needs to be able to conduct precision aerial gunnery and combat maneuvers, and be equipped with two 500 pound bombs, 2.75-inch rockets and rail-launched munitions in addition to its guns. The LAAR also must possess an infrared suppressor and other countermeasures such as a radar-warning receiver, and the cockpit must be armored. The plane should also be equipped with zero-altitude/zero-airspeed ejection seats as well.

Among the front runners expected to meet these requirements are the Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, the Air Tractor AT-802U, Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano, and the Pilatus PC-9 Trainer.

“The Super Tucano complies with most of the LAAR requirements, since it was developed from the ground to perform both training and light attack/COIN, close air support, border surveillance and armed ISR missions, as well as training missions and has been performing those missions very successfully,” said Acir Luiz de Almeida Padilha Jr., vice president marketing and sales, defense market. “Nevertheless, each client requires some specific customizations, which the Super Tucano can meet because of the flexible avionics architecture and the power, cooling and space available for new systems integration. This growth capacity and flexibility also allows us to integrate new weapons according to specific customer requirements.”

“We can say that our advantage over the competition is that we already have a battle proven product, with demonstrated capabilities flying in five different air forces. We have what the ground forces needs available now,” Padilha continued.

“The Super Tucano is the only operational aircraft that was developed from the ground for this mission,” said Padilha. “It has the highest weapons load in its class—3,400 pounds—and already has more than 40 external load configurations cleared, including dumb and intelligent weapons, 70 mm rockets, cluster bombs and air-to-air missiles. Another important feature is the EO/ IR sensors integrated with the weapons systems, with laser designation capacity. And above all, it’s has been proved in combat.”

The AT-802U is designed to provide inexpensive and prolonged ISR, logistic resupply, and force application capability to ground force commanders. It is based on the armored version of Air Tractor’s 16,000 pound gross weight AT-802 agricultural aircraft that has been supplied to the U.S. Department of State for narcotic crop eradication in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

“This armored AT-802 serves as a great starting point for the LAAR platform, said Lee Jackson, Air Tractor design engineer. “It is a two seat, dual control aircraft that can serve in a tactical training role as well as an operational role.”

According to the company, the AT-802U is combat ready with a fully integrated MX-15Di sensor turret that is capable of laser target designation, compact multiband data link that can stream real-time imagery and metadata, and an operational dual GAU-19/A .50 caliber gun system with over 2,700 rounds of ammunition. The aircraft has six wing hard points rated at over 600 pounds each and three centerline hard points rated at 1,000 pounds each. With an additional fuel tank, the aircraft has about ten hours of endurance. “We are so excited about the great interest that our aircraft has drawn from not only the special operations community but from partnering nations to the U.S. who are seeking a robust, inexpensive, and capable aircraft to protect and support their national interests,” said Jackson.

The HBC AT-6B is being developed as a joint venture with Lockheed Martin specifically to enter the LAAR competition. In a company press release, Hawker Beechcraft Chairman and CEO Bill Boisture said, “This teaming agreement marks a big step forward in working to meet the Air Force’s emerging irregular warfare needs. By teaming with Lockheed Martin, we will deliver an AT-6 LAAR aircraft that meets the training and light attack capabilities the Air Force needs in one flexible platform. The AT-6 is a low-risk, low-cost solution that complements existing combat aircraft capabilities and will contribute to the Air Force’s building partner capacity initiatives around the world.”

“The Hawker Beechcraft and Lockheed Martin team bring together the best of both worlds: a proven platform and a proven mission system integration capability,” added Marillyn Hewson, president of Lockheed Martin Systems Integration.

Light attack aircraft have the advantage of being able to launch from austere forward positions, and will not require fully paved runways for takeoff or landing. They will be able to remain aloft for several hours, and being armored and equipped with various sophisticated countermeasures, LAARs will be able to survive most threats from ground fire. They can also be specially outfitted for operations in mountainous terrains—all in all, a profile that should make the LAAR fleet, once it is established, particularly appealing to the special ops community.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG INTERDICTION

Much like their nautical counterparts’ riverine combat craft and fast boats, light attack aircraft have already proven themselves in law enforcement or drug interdiction operations.

Operating as a division of the U.S. State Department, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ Office of Aviation (INL/A) is charged with the mission of cutting off the supply of illicit drugs from foreign sources to the U.S.

Air operations by the bureau include aerial eradication of poppy fields and other drug crops, interdiction of refining laboratories and smuggling activities, and other law enforcement operations. The bureau operates some 340 fixed wing and rotary wing assets, including several that would be designated as light attack aircraft, that have flown successful counternarcotics missions in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Assets flown by INL/A include Air Tractor’s AT-802, armed and armored crop duster, and they have flown missions in conjunction with Embraer’s Super Tucanos flown by Brazilian and Columbian pilots.

ECONOMIES OF “SCALE”

It is not only tactics that are driving the need for light attack craft. The USAF is interested in combating the threats posed by insurgency and IW, with a solution that can be more cost-effective than a fully equipped jet fighter or a complex UAV system.

DoD has shown increased interest in purchasing these kinds of light attack aircraft, such as the armed crop dusters proved effective in the war on drugs, as commercial off-the-shelf deliverables requiring little or no modification for military operations.

According to Charles Vanderberg, acquisition program manager, light attack aircraft with ASC, “If the USAF decides to pursue an acquisition program, then a materiel development decision (MDD) would determine where in the DoD acquisition process the program would enter, either the engineering and manufacturing development phase if systems development is needed, or the production and deployment phase if a non-development item is suitable for the needed capability. If a MDD for LAAR occurs by September 2010, we would plan for earliest possible delivery by late FY13 or early FY14.”

Besides the current CRFI put out by ASC, the U.S. Navy is already evaluating an up-armed version of the Super Tucano under a classified testing program known as ‘Imminent Fury.’ Imminent Fury is currently testing a single aircraft, but the Navy is seeking a budget of $44 million to expand the program. The Special Operations Command, Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps are also interested in employing off-the-shelf air assets for lowintensity ISR with fast strike capability, and have expressed interest in the Armed Super Tucanos currently operated by Brazil, Columbia and the Dominican Republic.

The Air National Guard has also announced that it will enter into an evaluation of the Beechcraft AT-6 Texan II later this year. The USAF, while not committing to the purchase of a LAAR fleet yet, is ordering dozens of AT-6s on behalf of the rebuilding Iraqi air force.

EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN

In many ways, light attack aircraft are a modern day throwback to the powerful turbo prop fighters of yesteryear. Boeing recently confirmed that it is seriously considering reviving the Vietnam- era OV-10 Bronco program as a possible entry into the LAAR CRFI mix. Currently designated OV-10-X, the twinengine plane would maintain much of its 1960s-vintage rugged exterior, but the 21st century version will feature a computerized glass cockpit, ISR sensor arrays and smart bomb-dropping capabilities.

Chuck Burin, one of the founders and the current chairman of the board of the OV-10 Bronco Association (OBA) and who flew the venerable aircraft in Vietnam, thinks revamping the program would be a great idea. “The OV-10 is an aircraft that is ideal for what they need in a low-threat environment,” said Burin. “It is a proven concept.”

In fact, several years ago Burin said that a congressional representative who was trying to find out the status of available old OV-10’s approached him. His answer was—unfortunately—“ not so many.” While the Bronco is a proven platform that could fulfill the LAAR requirements, there are not enough existing airframes to upgrade. So if Boeing pursues this avenue, they will have to rebuild new aircraft. Said Burin, “You’re going to have to build a totally new aircraft, because there are just no old ones available. As far as I know the original tooling is still available—the wings will have to be beefed up to carry more weaponry, as will the engines, but I see no major problems getting the Bronco to meet the mission specs for LAAR.”

Several foreign militaries are still flying the Bronco, and incidentally, INL/A operates original OV-10 Broncos as part of their drug interdiction wing.

The light attack/armed reconnaissance fleet, if finally approved, would join a growing COIN air force within an air force. The USAF has already purchased 37 Hawker Beechcraft MC-12Ws to serve as manned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, filling a role previously served almost exclusively by UAVs—attesting to what special forces have always known: that when it comes to irregular warfare, the man is as important as the machine. http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-home/233-sotech-2010-volume-8-issue-2-march/2669-light-attack-armed-reconnaissance.html

Para el que no lo sepa o Ignore los aviones participante en este programa fueron A-29, OV-10X,AT-6B, A-67, Air Tractor AT-802U, Alenia Aermacchi M-346, resultando ganador el A-29 si los gringos se echaron para atrás es otra vaina, después estos aviones a según se iban para las fuerzas armadas de Afganistán y ya ni eso, pero originalmente les cuidarían el culo a los gringos ¿saben por qué ellos sacan este programa?, pues muy sencillo no les resulta rentable ni barato tener ni AH-64 y F-15 y F-16 en el teatro de operaciones y los mochos drones causan demasiados daños colaterales incluso a sus aliados, pero qué coño se retiran de forma gradual de Afganistán y ya la sinverguesura de los drones es tolerada porque el complejo militar indutrial impone su compra...
Para que vean lo malos que es tener un controlador aereo avanzados en el siglo 21

The LAAR Lightweight Combat Aircraft Is Coming to the Air Force
A small, nimble warplane – an economical featherweight compared to robust combat aircraft like the 40-ton F-15E Strike Eagle – now enjoys a high priority on the Air Force’s shopping list as the service remakes itself for counter-insurgency conflicts.

Under the OA-X program begun in September 2008, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz is pushing toward an eventual, $2 billion purchase of up to 100 Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft. The LAAR is likely to be a turboprop aircraft and will be part of mainstream Air Force operations. Air Combat Command (ACC) is performing developmental work rather than, as might be expected in an unorthodox effort, Air Force Special Operations Command.

One observer, given a glimpse of ACC’s capabilities-based assessment conducted in 2009, made the comment that, “this looks a lot like World War II.” That was a reference to the likely airframe and the guns and bombs it will carry, not to the 21st century digital avionics ACC expects to pack inside. An ACC official responded: “Yeah. We get that a lot.”

Among aircraft being proposed are the AirTractor AT802U (a modified crop duster, demonstrated at the 2009 Paris Air Show), Alenia M346, Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, and Pilatus PC-6 Porter. Pentagon officials say LAAR must be derived from an “in production” aircraft design. Boeing, however, is proposing an OV-10(X) Bronco, based on the twin-engine, twin-boom forward air control aircraft of the Vietnam era, which the planemaker would return to production at a facility not yet chosen.

The Air Force wants a “kinetic,” or rapid engagement, capability that, it says, “will reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline cycle.” The LAAR aircraft will also function as a digital-era forward air controller, coordinating fire directly with supported ground units through voice, video and datalinks – and minimizing the danger of blue-on-blue or “friendly fire” incidents.

One reason for LAAR and the OA-X program: operating cost. The Air Force wants an aircraft that can fly one combat hour for $1,000. A combat flight hour costs $7,750 for an F-16C Fighting Falcon and fully $44,000 for an F-15E Strike Eagle.

Typical air-to-ground ordnance for LAAR will include one or two podded 7.62-mm. mini-guns, two 500-pound guided-munitions, 2.75-inch rocket projectiles and the AGM-114N Hellfire air-to-ground missile. A “needs” document that does not yet have formal status calls for operating from austere airfields on five-hour missions over distances of 900 nautical miles up to a ceiling of 30,000 feet.

In its short-term plans for the new aircraft, the Air Force plans to purchase 15 examples in fiscal year 2011. ACC wants a 24-aircraft squadron ready for combat within two years and will then decide whether to equip an entire wing. If the program grows as expected, many of the aircraft will be assigned to Air National Guard units.

Last November, Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan) and Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stating concerns with reports that the United States and Brazil are negotiating for acquisition of Super Tucanos. Brownback and Tiahrt, strong defenders of the Wichita-built AT-6B, argued that such an agreement would “demean the integrity of the federal acquisition process” and cost thousands of American jobs.

Closely related to the OA-X program and the LAAR aircraft, the Navy is November 2009 launched Imminent Fury, a demonstrator program with a leased Super Tucano, designated A-29B in Pentagon parlance. The purpose: special operations support for SEAL teams in the field. The Imminent Fury aircraft is equipped with an electro-optical sensor in a nose turret and satellite and secure communications systems. According to one source, the Navy leased the Super Tucano from EP Aviation, a subsidiary of the contractor Xe Security, formerly Blackwater International.
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-laar-lightweight-combat-aircraft-is-coming-to-the-air-force/

Lo siento pero en Venezuela no había una simple la intención de Compra del A-29, por el caprichito de oficiales que después se fueron a Altamira, fue mucho más allá y ustedes los saben, no pretendan cambiar la historia, el veto retrasó que jode muchas cosas sobre todo en el escalón de entrenamiento y ataque ligero tanto que todavía er comandante les saca esos trapitos a los brasileros y gringo cada vez que puede y el K-8 fue adquirido casi como premio de consolación, todavía me acuerdo de algunos calificativos de algunos Aquí "el K-8 es como un Tucano de lento pero sin la Hélice" y así un bojote de vainas, menos mal que al final el avión resulto, pero todavi así el K-8 no es que se adapta a los resitos al menos de los gringos y que el A-29 cumplia, pero a falta de pan buenas son tortas, tanto que el A-29 puede tener armas guiadas y atacar por encima de las defensas enemigas y toda la paja no se crean ese cuento chino de que el K-8 era en un principio maná caido del cielo, ese avion se ha tenido que ganar a pulso su reputacion, por eso a pesar de todo el primer pedido no fue echo para los números que muchos esperavamos se hablo en principio de 24, para llegar a solo 18, K-8; cuando el A-29 tenia asegurado 36 aparatos, pero no es culpa del K-8 sino que el A-29 fue llevado diseñado para cumplir muchas misones para lo cual el K-8 debe adaptarse en el camino y ahora si dios quiere es que vamos por el segundo lote de K-8 ...

coño este articulo esta mas interesnte...

“Guns Guns Guns”
The continuing saga of the US and light attack aircraft
By Ed Timperlake


03/02/2011- In a practice air-to-air engagement, when one fighter closed on his opponent inside of the missile envelope to put the gun sight piper on the adversary, a call goes out “guns guns guns.” This is a blunt fighter pilot way of saying “your dead!” In real life, the aircraft’s machine guns or cannons will do the actual “speaking”, as the above video from a shoot down in South America shows. This video shows the aggressive and very successful use of a Tucano, which now is in consideration for use in combat in Afghanistan.

In a practice air-to-air engagement, when one fighter closed on his opponent inside of the missile envelope to put the gun sight piper on the adversary, a call goes out “guns guns guns.” This is a blunt fighter pilot way of saying “your dead!” In real life, the aircraft’s machine guns or cannons will do the actual “speaking”…

There is currently a competition to provide for a Light Combat Aircraft for the Afghan forces being trained by the USAF. But is interesting to ask why does the USAF need a competition in any case, given that there is only one battle tested competitor flying today. General Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has recently and forcefully stressed that industry should not be blowing smoke by laying off risk with over promising and sliding on delivery [1]. With that forceful philosophy it is amazing that the Super Tucano a proven aircraft isn’t already in Afghanistan. The shoot down is a demonstration of versatility of the air-to-air capability of the Tucano, now upgraded to Super Tucano. For Afghanistan, the truly important combat reality is the fact that the Colombian Air Force is having noteworthy success in the air-to-ground attack mode (AG) [2].

An LAA/LAS/LAAR For “End-Game Afghanistan” ?
Before any further discussion of roles and missions for an Afghanistan “light attack” aircraft can proceed, various definitions of what is being discussed must be clarified. The two planes in competition, a piloted turbo-prop like the AT-6 “Texan” and A-29 Super Tucano have been called a Light Attack Aircraft (LAA), a Light Attack Surveillance (LAS) aircraft and a Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft. These distinctions only become important when discussing the names given by DOD for awarding various technology contracts.

For example, a recent fly off between the Hawker Beech AT-6 and Embraer Super Tucano to select the appropriate combat aircraft for the emerging Afghan Air Force is a “LAS competition.” However the fly off didn’t include dropping bombs or strafing because the AT-6 when going into the event wasn’t certified to drop bombs nor does it have an internal gun.

So if the AF Chief is talking about unnecessary risk – perhaps in this case physician heal thyself.

The practical matter is the names (LAA/LAS/LAAR) are interchangeable, when discussing the need for a piloted combat aircraft on the lower end of any airborne “hi-low” mix. A piloted attack aircraft is also at least for now generally considered tactically above unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The current reason why the piloted aircraft is above UAS in capability is ‘eyes on” capability real time.

A piloted attack aircraft is also at least for now generally considered tactically above unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The current reason why the piloted aircraft is above UAS in capability is ‘eyes on” capability real time.

An airborne pilot is up close and personal with both sensors and combat teeth and is not fighting the battle from a computer consulted half a world away. Although, to be fair, some controllers are also closer to the action but still must operate through a data link.

One caveat that must always be acknowledged is that all airborne technology is relative and constantly evolving against a reactive enemy — so UAS may get better and begin to be substituted for any “hi-lo” piloted solution. But not anytime soon as a stay-behind force for the Afghan AF. And there is still an open question yet to be determined about whether UAS technology will be more vulnerable to “cyber attacks”. Another fact, not often mentioned, is that the UAS accident rate is significantly higher than piloted aircraft.

As far as piloted light attack, well respected warrior commanders with troops in combat have been aggressively pursuing a light attack surveillance aircraft for the counter-insurgency role (COIN) in Afghanistan for quite some time. As General Mattis testified when he was head of Joint Forces Command)to the Senate [3]:

A Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can provide a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air support. This year Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project called Imminent Fury where the Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy.

Now General Mattis as Commander of Central Command is still concerned about bring a light attack aircraft to the fight. As mentioned, a “buy” of a squadron of LAS aircraft is in a current selection board for a stay behind combat force as the US and NATO allies draw down troop levels in our current fight against the Taliban.

This current source selection will hopefully be a full and fair selection process to avoid industry “risk” and thus really begin the significant transition to successfully put Afghanistan in the rear view mirror. The initial positioning of a light attack aircraft in Afghanistan – previously sabotaged by improper Congressional meddling because of domestic politics in the last Congress – now becomes critical in “end game Afghanistan.”

Consequently, with a new Congress and a fresh start and an AF Chief who doesn’t want industry “smoke being blown,” perhaps the war fighters will finally get what they need –a totally capable combat proven light attack aircraft both for US special ops and the Afghan AF.

Consequently, with a new Congress and a fresh start and an AF Chief who doesn’t want industry “smoke being blown,” perhaps the war fighters will finally get what they need –a totally capable combat proven light attack aircraft both for US special ops and the Afghan AF.

It is long past time for a pilot flying a light attack in Afghanistan to let the machine guns and cannons, and more AG ordinance say “guns guns guns” against the Taliban on the ground—“your dead!” http://www.sldinfo.com/guns-guns-guns/

Y así puedo seguir todo el día, la vaina de vetar la compra por los gringos del A-29 si efectivamente es para joder, pero para fastidiarnos de manera muy bien pensada y justificada para ellos al negarnos un medio aéreo prácticamente insustituibles .... Me joden el entrenamiento de pilotos y me quitan de la boca el mejor avión y de mas bajos costos de operación para las misiones mas demandantes en las fronteras, y de paso me niegan los repuestos para el reto de los aviones como el T-27 y el Bronco que cumplen con muchas de esas misiones en la frontera, pues si esos bichos no hacen falta que ¡viva la pepa, carajo! ....

Ya vá:si el A-29 me arroja una bomba guiada,perfecto:pareces al fín"iluminado" por la idea queestoy intentando te entre en el cráneo,a eso me refiero:EN EL AMBIENTE COIN ACTUAL,ES INDISPENSABLE EL USO DE ARMAS STAND-OFF GUIADAS,ahora dime tú:¿cual arma guiada tiene el bronco ov-10?,ah!,¿no tiene?,entonces no nos sirve....porque no es como dices que"me pongo una venda en los ojos",sinó que ya se demostró,en combate,lo vulnerable de esas naves , si pretendes la barbaridad de usar OV-10 como COA en una ciudad,si yo fuera piloto y me mandas a sobrevolar una ciudad infestadad eterroristas con manpads modernos "para ver" donde está el enemigo y guiar artillería, te mando pal coño e la progenitora,¿tu crres que las mismas condiciones de la selva de vietnam son las mismas que las de una ciudad?,si es así estás creyendo en pajaritos preñados,porque,te lo repito:EN COMBATE,se DEMOSTRÓ que no sirven,¿te lo recuerdo?:27 de noviembre de 1992,ov-10 que bombardeaba miraflores,limpiamente derribado por sistema RBS-70,será que hay que derribar ochocientos broncos para demostrarle a arpía que esa mierda NO SIRVE para usarlo en ciudades?,¿o será que arpía cree que los "guerrilleros urbanos",(mercenarios,especialistas,insurgentes,terroristas) de ahora se ván a abstener por una extraña razón que solo arpia adivina,de usar MANPADS Y SHORADS?

A mí no me interesa cuantos videos y escritos me pongas si no se corresponden con las realidades que los hechos DEMUESTRAN,2 ó 3 aviones echados abajo sobre alepo ,el bronco derribado sobre caracas,son más que suficientes para que alguien pensante llegue a una conclusión obvia:"esto que estoy haciendo es estúpido",¿que en afganistán pueda servir?,pudiera ser:si le habilitan armas stand off y vuelan por encima del techo de los manpads ,o tal vez están muy seguros de que el tipo o cantidad de manpads que puedan tener la guerrilla taliban,no representan una amenaza significativa,aparte de esas consideraciones ,es obvio que en afganistán ,no tienen el inconveniente de una guerra de guerrillas de alta intensidad mezclada con civiles en las ciudades,pequeño detalle que obvias o no pareces percibir y que sería la gran diferencia con lo que nos podría tocar a nosostros:una siria 2,si lo percibieras dirías:"de verdad nick,es una locura hablar de COA Y COIN sobrevolando una ciudad infestada con guerrillas,cuando podemos dejar que la busqueda y designación de blancos lo hagan las fuerzas terrestres,o un UAV"(los UAV se usan para eso precisamente:reconocimiento),y si es por atacar focos de resistencia,que mejor que usar armas de largo alcance y guiadas en vez de picar con bombas y cohetes sobre la ciudad.Si te tomastes la molestia de leer de lo que resalté en rojo para arriba ,te darás cuenta de que son los DRONES los que mejor llevan a cabo esa tarea en el campo de batalla de hoy y que son la opción que priva para el COIN en la doctrina yanki y de la OTAN;esa es la doctrina actual de ellos,a despecho de que a los gringos no les interese perder el jugoso mercado de las plataformas COIN,pero te lo repito:no son las mismas necesidades las de los yankis que las nuestras,ni ellos tendrían que enfrentar la dura oposición que ellos si nos pueden crear a nosotros en nuestras ciudadaes.

nick7777 escribió:

Arpia escribió:

Ya vá:si el A-29 me arroja una bomba guiada,perfecto:pareces al fín"iluminado" por la idea queestoy intentando te entre en el cráneo,a eso me refiero:EN EL AMBIENTE COIN ACTUAL,ES INDISPENSABLE EL USO DE ARMAS STAND-OFF GUIADAS,ahora dime tú:¿cual arma guiada tiene el bronco ov-10?,ah!,¿no tiene?,entonces no nos sirve....porque no es como dices que"me pongo una venda en los ojos",sinó que ya se demostró,en combate,lo vulnerable de esas naves , si pretendes la barbaridad de usar OV-10 como COA en una ciudad,si yo fuera piloto y me mandas a sobrevolar una ciudad infestadad eterroristas con manpads modernos "para ver" donde está el enemigo y guiar artillería, te mando pal coño e la progenitora,¿tu crres que las mismas condiciones de la selva de vietnam son las mismas que las de una ciudad?,si es así estás creyendo en pajaritos preñados,porque,te lo repito:EN COMBATE,se DEMOSTRÓ que no sirven,¿te lo recuerdo?:27 de noviembre de 1992,ov-10 que bombardeaba miraflores,limpiamente derribado por sistema RBS-70,será que hay que derribar ochocientos broncos para demostrarle a arpía que esa mierda NO SIRVE para usarlo en ciudades?,¿o será que arpía cree que los "guerrilleros urbanos",(mercenarios,especialistas,insurgentes,terroristas) de ahora se ván a abstener por una extraña razón que solo arpia adivina,de usar MANPADS Y SHORADS?

A mí no me interesa cuantos videos y escritos me pongas si no se corresponden con las realidades que los hechos DEMUESTRAN,2 ó 3 aviones echados abajo sobre alepo ,el bronco derribado sobre caracas,son más que suficientes para que alguien pensante llegue a una conclusión obvia:"esto que estoy haciendo es estúpido",¿que en afganistán pueda servir?,pudiera ser:si le habilitan armas stand off y vuelan por encima del techo de los manpads ,o tal vez están muy seguros de que el tipo o cantidad de manpads que puedan tener la guerrilla taliban,no representan una amenaza significativa,aparte de esas consideraciones ,es obvio que en afganistán ,no tienen el inconveniente de una guerra de guerrillas de alta intensidad mezclada con civiles en las ciudades,pequeño detalle que obvias o no pareces percibir y que sería la gran diferencia con lo que nos podría tocar a nosostros:una siria 2,si lo percibieras dirías:"de verdad nick,es una locura hablar de COA Y COIN sobrevolando una ciudad infestada con guerrillas,cuando podemos dejar que la busqueda y designación de blancos lo hagan las fuerzas terrestres,o un UAV"(los UAV se usan para eso precisamente:reconocimiento),y si es por atacar focos de resistencia,que mejor que usar armas de largo alcance y guiadas en vez de picar con bombas y cohetes sobre la ciudad.Si te tomastes la molestia de leer de lo que resalté en rojo para arriba ,te darás cuenta de que son los DRONES los que mejor llevan a cabo esa tarea en el campo de batalla de hoy y que son la opción que priva para el COIN en la doctrina yanki y de la OTAN;esa es la doctrina actual de ellos,a despecho de que a los gringos no les interese perder el jugoso mercado de las plataformas COIN,pero te lo repito:no son las mismas necesidades las de los yankis que las nuestras,ni ellos tendrían que enfrentar la dura oposición que ellos si nos pueden crear a nosotros en nuestras ciudadaes.

Como que él que no entiende soy vos... primero tu pretendes sustituir misiones COIN de o ataque ligero con UAV eso no se puede hacer en un 100%, los Aviones COIN en la mayoría de los casos vuelan bajo las mismas condiciones que un UAV ó un UCAV donde no existe fuerzas aéreas ni unidades antiaérea que los repela, otra si bien el Bronco no lleva armas guiadas el A-29 que teníamos visto, pues si, y es pensado para habientes mas hostiles... tercero si bien tu le das una gran importancia a la presencia MANDPAD la verdad es que parte de los requisitos del programa LAAR debía disponer alerta de misiles, RWR y lanzamiento de Chaff y Flare los colombianos tenían esa opción para incorporar a sus A-29, de algunas de estas contramedidas, pero... ese es su peo, y el Mandpad como arma existe desde casi la entrada en ser vicio del Bronco y ambas armas han evolucionado a los largo de todos estos años por si no los sabes las últimas versiones del Bronco en el USMC disponían de contramedidas, los derribos “fallos técnicos” ocurridos en la primera guerra del golfo se atribuyen a aviones viejos que no habían sido modernizados al último estándar y en contra de unidades Iraquíes muy bien equipadas sobrepasando al diseño original del avión, por otro lado los aviones derribado sobre Alepo quizás a excepción del MIG pero no se sabe cómo, donde o cuando y las condiciones de derribo por estar en pleno desarrollo ese conflicto de resto es PAJA, por tanta guerra mediática, si realmente al parecer no tenían contramedidas o si los sirios usan guante blanco para evitar bajas civiles y no emplean aviones mucho más avanzados hasta ahora solo he visto entrenadores en su mayoría empleados como aviones de ataque ligero, no aviones de asalto como el SU-25 en nuestro caso lo que más se acerca a estos son el F-5 y F-16, el cual tampoco es garantía de sobrevivencia al 100% en presencia de Misiles ó incluso cañones, con esto quiero decir que la amenaza en principio es igual para aviones de diferente tipo y hay que aprender a vivir con la amenaza para sobrellevarla y tratar de derrotarla eso es así desde que existen las fuerzas aéreas, sino el que se mete a piloto en principio debe preguntarse ¿para qué coño me metí a piloto militar?, el riesgo es parte del trabajo…. solo se puede acreditar el derribo del OV-10 en Caracas, por armas ligeras siempre que no tenga nada que ver el F-16 que lo perseguía de resto y de echo recibió pepazos de 20mm del F-16… el fuego de armas ligeras se pudo evitar y de hecho es evitado por las técnicas de vuelo empleadas por estos aviones en frontera al realizar ataques a tierra, no te vayas a creer que esos aviones solo desfilan en la frontera, de vez en cuando llegan uno que otro con un plomazo, pero en el golpe de noviembre eso no puede evitarse porque no solo se a ataca desde tierra sino desde el aire teniendo que volar lento y bajo para evitar al F-16 exponiéndose a ser grandemente impactado por fuego de armas ligeras de las tropas leales, eso esta full documentado. Para finalizar Igualito vamos a tener que usar ese tipo de aeronaves una porque realizan el entrenamiento de pilotos en el caso de A/T-27 y K-8 otra es porque también brinda experiencia bajo condiciones operativas de combate a mas bajo costo para los pilotos que pretendan seguir su periplo de entrenamiento y paso a otras unidades conforme se desarrolla su carrera eso es el Bronco y el K-8 en el G-15, el Bronco se va, por viejo, pero no porque no encaje en las actuales doctrinas de guerra asimétrica…

Chau